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Abstract
This paper examines the policy processes of 
devolution and democratisation of natural resource 
management as they relate to community-based 
natural resource management (CBNRM) outcomes 
in Botswana and Zimbabwe. Devolution and 
democratisation of natural resource management 
are socially and politically contested issues that 
reveal interesting insights about the nature of 
local governance and democratic practices in 
these two countries. Through an analysis of 
factors affecting the CBNRM policy process 
– including the role of key actors, sets of policy 
ideas and narratives, and political influences – the 
authors identified evidence of shrinking political 
and policy spaces for local communities and 
civil society to effectively influence policy. This 
shrinking of political and policy spaces reflects 
a limitation of democratic practice and space in 
Botswana and Zimbabwe due to authoritarian 
political practices and socio-political and 
economic challenges. These factors have stifled 
opportunities for devolution of natural resource 
management and positive CBNRM outcomes. 
Based on primary and secondary data, this study 
argues that if this impasse is to be overcome, 
policy making and implementation of CBNRM 
should take cognisance of socio-economic and 
political forces at local and national levels and 
recognise the intimate links between these levels. 
Evidence from the two countries indicates that 
strong and influential actor-networks – which are 
necessarily locally driven – are vital in mobilising 
strong political support which in turn is central 
in the development of an appropriate policy 
environment. The evidence further suggests 
that local government can play a crucial role 
in sustaining CBNRM in the face of threats of 
recentralisation from political and economic 
elites in whose interest recentralisation lies. At 
the national level, local government can play 
a critical role in maintaining political support 
and legitimacy for CBNRM. At the local level, 
it provides essential checks and balances that 
can prevent elite capture of benefits and provide 
neutral arbitration services when community 
polarisation stalls momentum. Ultimately, the 
paper argues that local government can be a 
vital element in ensuring democratic outcomes, 
serving as an effective link between local and 
national scales. CBNRM implementers and 
advocates need to ensure that institutional and 
legal arrangements strike a delicate balance in 
serving the interests of marginalised communities 
through devolution and allowing decentralisation 
to empower local communities to direct their 
destiny through the creation of democratic policy 
spaces. This requires paying attention to the 
political landscape of CBNRM and engaging in 
innovative and strategic political manoeuvring 
and dialogue with government bureaucrats, 
politicians and other relevant stakeholders. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper provides a comparative analysis 
of CBNRM policy processes and outcomes 
in Botswana and Zimbabwe, and highlights 
the challenges and implications of devolving 
authority over natural resources to local-
level institutions.1 It explores whether further 
devolution is desirable and/or achievable, and, 
if so, under what conditions. Its focus is the 
process of policy development and programme 
implementation. This illustrates how process and 
outcomes comprise reactions to social complexity 
where decision making is dominated by politics 
at both national and local levels. Ultimately, it 
brings into question whether devolution is the 
‘panacea’ and decentralisation the ‘problem’ 
that they are often portrayed to be by CBNRM 
advocates.2
A comparative analysis of CBNRM policy 
processes and outcomes in Botswana and 
Zimbabwe was conducted. The operational 
realities of CBNRM in these two countries 
revealed interesting similarities and differences, 
which have constantly and differentially fed into 
and informed policy development in each country. 
Particular attention was paid to the degree to 
which CBNRM policy makers, implementers 
and advocates engaged mainstream political and 
development processes in the two countries and 
considering whether such engagement translated 
into the development of sufficient political 
momentum to ensure sustainability. This specific 
interest in ‘strategic’ political dimensions of 
CBNRM was driven by the recognition that its 
political ‘landscape’ has far-reaching implications 
for devolution and, ultimately, for changing the 
status quo and levers of power. After all, control 
over valuable resources is an inherently contested 
political process. 
Given these far-reaching political implications, it 
is naive to see CBNRM as merely a technically and 
economically feasible and apolitical conservation 
strategy. An alternative view is that it is a socio-
political process with the potential to stimulate 
significant social and political transformation by 
including rural communities in national political 
processes and inculcating democratic values and 
good governance, as well as promoting economic 
development on marginal rural and communal 
lands. When viewed from this standpoint, 
CBNRM becomes a platform for empowering 
and strengthening national and local processes 
of democracy and governance. Understanding 
this objective requires ‘passionate’ exploration 
and examination of the potential of CBNRM 
in strengthening ‘constituent accountability’ 
(Murphree 2000). 
The study contextualises CBNRM policy 
processes within the broader social, political 
and economic conditions of the two countries. 
This illustrates how national and international 
political, social, economic, legal and policy 
factors shape outcomes. The development of 
governance, devolution and decentralisation 
structures, processes and systems depends on 
whether there is an enabling and supportive 
framework (legislative and institutional) as well 
as on the social capital upon which CBNRM 
can thrive. These factors are essential in creating 
an environment which enables the appropriate 
legal rights and status of local communities to 
be conferred and nurtured. An examination of 
these factors allowed the authors to infer the 
opportunities and threats to devolution and 
democratisation of natural resource management 
in Botswana and Zimbabwe.
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2. Study methodology
This paper is based on primary research, 
secondary sources and interviews undertaken by 
the lead author. The research protocol consisted 
of interviews or focus group discussions with key 
informants, who were or are involved in CBNRM 
implementation, were keen observers of it or were 
affected by it. This group included government 
officials (both politicians and bureaucrats), 
members of selected rural communities, staff 
from non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
CBNRM practitioners, donors, academics and the 
media. Over 100 interviews were conducted in 
each country over a six-month period. The authors 
acknowledge that we, like all other researchers, 
have our own personal and research biases. The 
approach adopted when conducting interviews, 
letting others tell their stories rather than working 
with a pre-defined, structured academic agenda, 
was intentionally chosen to minimise bias. 
This approach forced us to hear, acknowledge 
and move some way towards understanding 
the complexity and nuanced interpretations 
of situations than would otherwise have been 
possible. When specific facts or incidences were 
revealed, we made every effort to verify these 
through triangulation. Given the sensitivity 
of the information collected, the authors have 
withheld names of some interviewees on ethical 
grounds. 
The document analysis of official government 
documents, NGO documents and correspondence, 
newspaper articles and academic publications 
provides insight into official perspectives. 
Quantitative data collection and analysis 
focused primarily on generating descriptive 
statistics to quantify and substantiate the 
qualitative material.3 
On a cautionary note, the detailed village-
level findings of this study cannot be generalised 
to all CBNRM programmes in southern Africa or 
even within Botswana or Zimbabwe. However, 
the analysis of the policy process and the 
implications this has for effective outcomes do 
hold general policy implications for CBNRM.
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3. Conceptual and theoretical 
framework
The analytical framework of this study is provided 
by the ‘policy process’ framework developed by 
Keeley and Scoones (2003). Policy development 
is viewed as the product of ongoing negotiations 
and bargaining between multiple actors over 
time. It is a dynamic process, constantly being 
informed by implementation experience, evolving 
in response to it and responding to political 
pressures. The relevance of the ‘policy process’ 
framework lies in its ability to integrate politics 
with an analysis of the policy environment, 
therefore providing important conceptual and 
analytical tools for the examination of CBNRM 
as a contested social and political process. Our 
selection of approach was motivated by the desire 
to analyse and understand the genesis, inception 
and programmatic development of CBNRM 
policies, to understand how they differ and how 
such differences are contextually mediated. This 
is of central importance in understanding the 
nature of political support for CBNRM and its 
relationship with the broader social, political and 
devolutionary processes. 
Given global concern about ‘getting things 
right’ within policy frameworks in development 
and environmental management, particular focus 
in natural resource management has been directed 
at a whole range of policies that are relevant to it, 
for example, agricultural services, environmental 
protection, land tenure, input supply and so on 
(Keeley & Scoones 2003). As demonstrated in 
this study, the complexity introduced by the wide 
range of social and political processes and policy 
frameworks relevant to CBNRM goes beyond 
even the already complex situation of concern 
with policies directly relevant to environmental 
management. For example, decentralisation and 
local government reform, land reform, affirmative 
action, economic structural adjustment and 
constitutional reform all influence CBNRM 
policy. Such a broad context brings in a wide 
range of different actors with differing agendas 
from within and outside government – from local-
level authorities and bureaucrats to international 
environmentalists, all of whom have some 
involvement and interest in the formulation and 
implementation of policy. Keeley and Scoones 
(2003:1) note that, in order to understand such 
policy processes, ‘we must ask how policies are 
framed, who is included and who is excluded in 
the process, which actors and which interests are 
dominant, and how policy changed over time’. 
Following Keeley and Scoones (2003), this study 
explores the above-mentioned questions using 
three overlapping approaches to understand 
policy change as: 
• a reflection of structured political interests
• a product of the agency of actors engaged in 
the policy arena
• part of overarching power-knowledge 
relations that discursively frame practice in 
particular ways.
This framework allows for an analysis that 
embodies a variety of ‘conceptual lenses’ to 
highlight the continuous interactions between 
discourse, political interests and multiple actors, 
and illustrates the complex dynamics and 
structural constraints affecting devolution of 
natural resource management. It also sheds light 
on political dynamics and opportunities for action 
and change in natural resource management. 
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4. Background literature 
Historically, southern Africa witnessed alien and 
racially discriminatory environmental and natural 
resource management policies that undermined 
local environmental management and livelihood 
strategies and entrenched state dominance in 
natural resource management (Anderson & 
Grove 1987; Fabricius et al. 2004). With the 
transition to democracy, political pressure begun 
to mount on national governments to de-racialise 
resource management (Child 2004; Mandondo 
2000) and develop natural resource management 
policies that contributed to rural development 
objectives (Jones & Murphree 2001; Adams & 
Mulligan 2003). The de-racialisation of natural 
resource management entailed revisiting resource 
governance and ownership with the intention 
of enabling local communities to participate in 
resource management. The imperative for more 
equitable resource management was given added 
impetus by the critical need for socio-economic 
development. 
This new approach, commonly known 
as CBNRM, focused on decentralisation of 
environmental management responsibilities, with 
the objective of increasing public participation 
and benefits. It was concerned with legitimising 
conservation-cum-development interventions 
and enhancing prospects for sustainability. 
However, this alternative approach now faces 
sustained criticism on the grounds that it 
has failed to live up to its earlier promise of 
delivering economically enhanced livelihoods 
and biodiversity conservation (Turner 2004; 
IIED 2004; Adams & Mulligan 2003; Hutton 
et al. 2006). Its proponents acknowledge that 
CBNRM has had problems in achieving these 
goals but draw attention to its successes in 
terms of community empowerment, governance 
and democratisation (Turner 2004; Ribot 2002; 
Murphree 2000). 
The last decade has seen growing consensus 
among CBNRM advocates and implementers that 
the success of CBNRM strategies hinges upon 
the transfer of power not to local government 
authorities (decentralisation) but to local 
community institutions (devolution). This 
consensus is led by those such as Katerere (2002), 
Jones and Murphree (2001), Murombedzi (2003) 
and Shackleton and Campbell (2001), all of 
whom lament the lack of progress in devolving 
‘real’ power to communities despite the rhetoric 
of devolution and point at this as lying at the 
heart of problems. These same commentators 
acknowledge that a shift from decentralisation 
to devolution is politically and economically 
controversial and hinders progress.
However, this idealistic embracing of 
devolution as the ‘final solution’ to the problems 
besetting CBNRM fails to take into account 
the wealth of experience from elsewhere that 
demonstrates that devolution does not necessarily 
result in poverty reduction, improved governance, 
natural resource management or democratisation 
(Johnson, 2001; Cook & Manor 1998; Agrawal 
& Gibson, 2001), as do the findings presented 
here. At the forefront of problems associated 
with devolution is the possibility of local elite 
capture and thus the perpetuation of poverty 
and inequality. Luckham et al (2001) note 
that it is doubtful that the introduction of 
democratic principles on their own (as embodied 
in devolution) will enable the overcoming of 
historical and cultural factors perpetuating 
political inequality. This highlights the challenge 
of encouraging democracy in rural areas where 
large numbers of people are dependent upon small 
numbers of local, powerful elites, as in the case of 
Botswana and Zimbabwe. Acknowledging these 
problems is not, however, to deny that devolution 
can enhance rural livelihoods in many ways. 
Conversely, there is considerable evidence 
globally that local councils have a vital role to 
play in ensuring democratic outcomes (Cohen 
1974; Crook & Sverrison 2001; Harbeson 2001; 
Ribot 2004; Sundar 2001). Mamdani (1996:299) 
argues that ‘participatory forms (empowerment) 
that stress the autonomy of a bounded group 
– only to undermine any possibility of an 
alliance-building majority-based representation 
– can justify and uphold the most undemocratic 
forms of central power’, and draws upon various 
cases studies to illustrate what ‘began with an 
emphasis on participation [and] ended up with 
a warlord’. Mamdani (1996:296) concludes 
that ‘to create a democratic solidarity requires 
joining the emphasis on autonomy with the 
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one on alliance, that on participatory self-rule 
with one on representational politics’. Many of 
these commentators maintain that what matters 
is not the degree of state intervention, that is, 
more or less devolution, but the level of state 
accountability. Finding the right balance is key 
and variable, depending on the particular context 
of each country. Woodhouse (2003:17–18) 
argues that:
the important element of ‘re-centralisation’ 
is that the politics of the (central) 
government will have a key role in setting 
the terms on which local institutions…
operate. Generally, if political goals 
such as improving the position of the 
disadvantaged are not identified and 
pursued by the central state, it is unlikely 
they will arise spontaneously at the ‘local’ 
level. 
In view of these commentaries, the challenge 
facing CBNRM then is one of striking a delicate 
balance in serving the interests of marginalised 
communities through state intervention and 
allowing decentralisation to empower local 
communities to direct their destiny. Put simply, a 
properly democratic system requires the effective 
linking of the local and the national. Achieving 
the necessary linkages has as yet largely eluded 
CBNRM.
In view of these commentaries and our own 
research, we believe that decentralisation has its 
place, and, when applied appropriately, it creates 
space for devolution. While decentralising 
natural resource management to arms of local 
government may be politically and economically 
expedient in newly independent countries, 
devolving ‘real’ power and authority remains 
outside the interests of states as it goes against 
their own appropriative interests (Murphree 
2000). Therefore, devolution will depend largely 
on the willingness of central government to 
share power. This, in turn, depends on whether 
CBNRM can catalyse the support of national and 
local political economic elites and bureaucratic 
interests so that they provide momentum to 
carry forward devolution. This implies there is a 
need to understand the interests of the political 
economic elites in shaping policy and political 
contexts. 
Our research provides compelling evidence 
from Botswana and Zimbabwe that supports the 
arguments of those commentators who call for 
caution in advocating devolution at the expense 
of decentralisation. Local government plays a 
crucial role in catalysing this political support 
and thus in creating an environment that enables 
devolution and democratisation of natural 
resource management, and this requires closer 
scrutiny. Firstly, local government provides the 
institutional mechanism through which to ensure 
that CBNRM is mainstreamed within national 
development priorities, an essential process 
if CBNRM is to gain the necessary political 
support to push through the appropriate policy 
reforms. Secondly, local government provides the 
essential link between the local and the national, 
which represents a key requirement for a properly 
democratic system. Thirdly, local government 
institutions are a vital repository of the skills 
and capacity that are required for effective 
implementation at the local level. Fourthly, as 
democratically elected institutions, they have a 
role to play in providing checks and balances at 
the local level to prevent capture of CBNRM by 
local elites, and in allowing democratic practice 
and local governance to flourish. 
Understanding and resolving the problems that 
currently beset CBNRM requires an appreciation 
and investigation that goes beyond viewing it 
as simply a technically feasible conservation 
strategy. Serious interrogation of the social, legal 
and legislative, and political factors that influence 
devolutionary dynamics is required. In essence, 
attention has to be paid to the political landscape 
of CBNRM, and innovative and strategic 
political manoeuvring, dialogue and engagement 
with government bureaucrats, politicians and 
other relevant stakeholders – particularly local 
communities, local political economic elites and 
traditional authorities – have to be emphasised.
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5. Case study 1: Botswana
Background 
This section explores the process of policy 
development and implementation in Botswana. 
It reveals how the process and outcomes reflect 
social and political complexities in decision 
making dominated by political economic interests 
at both national and local levels. The policy 
environment in which CBNRM was introduced 
and implemented is reviewed to identify macro-
level policy trends and structured political 
interests contextualising CBNRM and to examine 
how these have constrained and influenced policy. 
An analysis of the actor networks involved in 
policy making and implementation is undertaken 
to determine the impact of these networks on 
CBNRM processes and outcomes. The paper 
also highlights the dynamic relationship between 
processes at the local level and the national 
level. This analysis indicates that the current 
problems facing CBNRM result from myriad 
social, political and economic processes at local 
and national scales. These include the manner 
in which programmes were implemented in 
the context of socio-political and economic 
challenges. Many problems relate directly to the 
origins of the CBNRM programme, the Natural 
Resources Management Project (NRMP) and its 
successors, and the manner in which they were 
and are being implemented. The problems range, 
for example, from the historical dominance of 
the NRMP by expatriate staff, which has led to 
a striking absence of a supportive national ‘actor 
network’, and the failure of key individuals 
to emerge as CBNRM advocates and ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’ to the nature of the strategies 
adopted by the NRMP for the enhancement of 
local community-based organisation (CBO) 
governance capacities. These strategies have 
served to enhance the powers of local elites 
at the expense of marginalised members in a 
community. 
A  p rob lemat i c  f ac to r  shap ing  the 
implementation process is the broader national 
policy and political environment that often 
tends to contradict and undermine CBNRM. For 
example, the overall trend towards privatisation, 
the dominance of cattle-focused policies in rural 
development strategies and Batswana culture, 
and the weak state of civil society present major 
problems. Whilst there often appears to be an 
uncritical acceptance of the ‘progressive’ state of 
democracy in Botswana, a serious re-examination 
of its current political system and climate reveals 
an increasingly autocratic political atmosphere 
dominated by a few senior political figures 
(Molutsi, 2005; Swatuk 2005). Several of these 
have become personally involved in CBNRM 
policy development and play a critical role in 
shaping its outcomes.4
When CBNRM was first introduced into 
Botswana in 1989, it was greeted with optimism 
within the Department of Wildlife and National 
Parks (DWNP), other relevant ministries and 
NGOs. Its formal introduction was under the 
auspices of the well-funded and competently 
staffed USAID-supported NRMP. Underpinning 
the programme was the scientific rationale 
of sustainable use and the perception that 
socio-political and environmental conditions 
in Botswana were ideal for the successful 
implementation of CBNRM. It was accepted as 
an ecologically and economically viable land use 
option in significant portions of the country. 
Very low and sparse population densities of 
approximately 1.5 million people with an average 
density of 2.4 per square kilometre, high-value 
resources, a limited range of alternative land use 
options,5 with only 5% of the land suitable for 
productive agriculture (UNDP 2005; Whiteside et 
al. 1995), and relatively small and ‘homogenous’ 
communities were considered ideal conditions 
for CBNRM. The national policy and political 
priorities, emphasis on ‘citizen participation and 
citizen empowerment’, sustainable development 
and sustainable use of natural resources, 
economic diversification and commitment to 
decentralisation (Picard 1987) all appeared to 
provide a hospitable policy framework. The 
nation enjoyed an apparent commitment to open 
democratic government6 which, coupled with 
strong economic performance, led to the dubbing 
of Botswana by some observers as ‘the African 
Miracle’ (Thumberg-Hartland 1978; Samatar 
1999). These conditions presented an ideal 
context in which to implement CBNRM. 
However, our research in Botswana in 2005 
revealed a very different and disturbing picture 
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about the devolutionary dynamics and democratic 
promise of CBNRM. Today its prospects look 
bleak. There is a general concern about the 
broadly perceived failure of CBNRM to live up 
to its expectations, and it has become mired in 
political controversy that threatens the future of 
the programme. It is increasingly viewed with 
scepticism and, at worst, outright antagonism, 
having attracted opposition from powerful 
political economic elites. Support within DWNP 
is limited to a few dedicated but relatively junior 
individuals while senior managers are either 
overtly hostile or indifferent. Interest and support 
from NGOs and donors have waned, whilst many 
in the private sector are vocal in their opposition to 
community involvement in wildlife management. 
Even within participating villages, there is little 
evidence of what Murphree (1995) describes as 
a ‘politically salient constituency’ supportive of 
CBNRM. Without the growth of this grassroots 
constituency, it is proving difficult to build and 
sustain the political momentum and necessary 
support for CBNRM at the local or national 
level. Despite the rhetoric of empowerment at the 
local level still being popular in Botswana, there 
appears to have been little real empowerment of 
local communities as the benefits have largely 
been captured by local-level elites. Given the 
weak influence of current CBNRM implementers 
in broader policy making and in directing 
strategic political dialogue with policy makers 
and politicians, it seems now to be at the mercy 
of the whims of political economic elites. 
National context
Economic status
Since independence in 1965, the Botswana 
economy has undergone a transformation from 
poverty to relative affluence.7 Despite this, 
there are huge disparities in wealth, and 47% 
of the population continue to live below the 
poverty line. Whilst Botswana’s growth in gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita was the 
highest in the world for the period 1970–97, the 
country actually experienced a drop in its Human 
Development Index ranking, from 95th to 131st 
place, between 1991 and 2004 (UNDP 2005), 
which, as Good and Taylor (2005) point out, 
makes it the only country in the world to suffer 
a fall during a period of rapid economic growth. 
Diamond mining has fuelled much of the growth 
and currently accounts for more than one-third 
of GDP and for nine-tenths of export earnings. 
Tourism and cattle are other key sectors and it 
is on the promotion of these three sectors that 
government policy focuses. 
Political characteristics
The imminent ascendancy of Vice-President Ian 
Khama to high political office has, because of 
his autocratic tendencies, raised questions about 
possibilities of classic ‘big man’ rule and political 
dominance (Good & Taylor 2005, Swatuk 2005) 
characteristic of many African countries (Chabal 
& Daloz 1999). This is accompanied by growing 
concern that ‘Botswana is governed by a small 
elite whose political and business interests are 
mutually reinforcing’ (Swatuk 2005:1). The 
political and economic interests of these elites are 
interconnected, historically rooted in the ‘cattle 
culture’ (Peters 1994) and in mineral exploitation, 
particularly diamonds (Good &Taylor 2005). 
More recently, there are indications that senior 
politicians are becoming increasingly involved 
in the tourism industry8 (Swatuk 2005), which 
has profound implications for CBNRM policy 
development. In order to understand how and 
why CBNRM policy is developing in a pro-
elite manner, it is necessary to understand its 
implications for these governing elites. 
Whilst all the trappings and institutions of a 
liberal democracy are in place (Obeng 2001), 
Good and Taylor (2005) demonstrate how these 
are manipulated by the ruling elites, both through 
the constitution and through contemporary 
practice of the ruling party, based on the inherited 
political culture.9 Such political characteristics 
do not lend themselves to increasing public 
participation in the policy-making process and 
public debate. As this paper demonstrates in its 
discussion of the current process surrounding 
the revisions to the draft CBNRM policy, this 
political climate has led to an environment 
that enables the policy-making process to be 
undertaken without consultation, transparency or 
accountability. The situation constrains political 
and policy spaces by negatively affecting 
dialogue, public participation and engagement 
in policy-making debates.
Civil society10 
Civil society in Botswana is relatively weak 
and disorganised. Even prior to the withdrawal 
of donors from the country in 2003,11 capacity 
was already limited in comparison to other 
countries in the region in terms of numbers, 
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financial and human resources, skills and 
specialisation (Molutsi & Holm 1990). Civil 
society is/was dependent upon donor funding 
and the withdrawal of financing weakened civil 
society further. Compounding these problems is 
the tendency of civic groups to court government 
favour by actively seeking representation of 
senior political figures within their governance 
structures, thus weakening their ability to 
independently represent alternative perspectives 
to government. The weakness of civil society has 
direct and significant implications for CBNRM, 
as discussed below.
Policy and legislative context 
In order to understand CBNRM in Botswana, an 
examination of the policy context within which it 
operates is essential. Local-level implementation 
over the last 15 years has outpaced policy 
making and legislation. Whilst attempts to draft 
a comprehensive policy have been ongoing 
since 1996, these have now become mired in 
controversy, with ongoing efforts by the most 
powerful political figures in the country to 
overturn the draft policy document. This draft 
promotes a devolutionary approach to natural 
resource management and was agreed upon by 
all stakeholders in 2004 (IUCN 2004). Current 
efforts by senior government figures aim to 
replace it with a policy that will recentralise 
control over natural resources. Without a clearly 
defined and comprehensive CBNRM policy, 
the operation and implementation of CBNRM 
remains largely influenced by fragmented pieces 
of policy associated with wildlife conservation 
(1986 Wildlife Conservation Policy), tourism 
policy (1990 Tourism Policy), rural development 
policy (revised 2002 Rural Development Policy), 
and the 2004 draft CBNRM policy. It is this policy 
vacuum which has laid bare the implementation 
and operation of CBNRM to socio-economic and 
political manipulation and abuse, inconsistencies 
and accountability challenges. 
Wildlife, conservation and tourism 
policies 
A number of policies and laws were developed 
in the 1980s and 1990s that created an enabling 
environment by making general provision for 
community involvement in wildlife use and 
management.12 Despite these, at the moment it is 
still an administrative arrangement in the form of 
the ‘Community Natural Resources Management 
Lease’ or ‘head lease’ that provides the legal 
basis for CBNRM. This lack of an over-arching 
policy document has significantly hampered 
implementation over the last decade, creating 
competition and conflicts between ministries 
and departments whose own mandates may 
contradict the spirit and method of CBNRM. 
The absence of integrated legislation has meant 
that it has continued to be implemented primarily 
by DWNP, with limited co-operation from the 
Agricultural Resources Board (ARB), relevant 
land boards and district councils (DCs). As events 
relating to a 2001 SAVINGRAM13 illustrate, this 
arrangement has significantly undermined the 
ability of CBNRM to achieve its goals. As rights 
are not entrenched in legislation, they can easily 
be removed by administrative actions because of 
policy changes or, as is the case at the moment, 
at the behest of senior politicians. 
Rural development strategies and their 
impact 
CBNRM operates within a rural context, and 
therefore synergy between it and other rural 
development policy has to be created. Without 
this critical integration, CBNRM fails to buttress 
rural development strategies and vice versa. 
The mutual objectives of rural development and 
CBNRM would be strengthened by stimulating 
both community focus and development 
interests in CBNRM policy and weeding off 
inconsistencies, gaps and conflicts. This study 
does not review these policies in any detail, but 
highlights the importance of creating synergies 
between CBNRM and other sectors that have a 
bearing on its success, direction and impact on 
democratic resource governance. 
Twyman (2001) argues that, as recently 
as 1995, Botswana did not have a clear and 
coherent rural development policy, and that 
rural development was characterised by a set 
of overlapping and disparate programmes that 
hindered effective development in rural areas. 
Perhaps not surprisingly then, the history of rural 
development efforts and policies in Botswana is 
strewn with a lengthy list of – often externally-
driven – development ‘failures’ whose overall 
impact is generally considered to have increased 
rural poverty and inequality and created a culture 
of dependency and ‘clientification’ within 
rural areas, most notably among the Basarwa 
(Hitchcock 2003; Hitchcock & Holm 1993; 
Taylor 2000; Saugestad 1998; Twyman 1998). 
In response to these shortcomings in earlier 
approaches, and informed by the international 
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shift in development discourse, the Government 
of Botswana introduced the Community Based 
Strategy for Rural Development in 1997. This 
seemed to mark the beginning of a shift in strategy 
away from an imposed top-down approach to one 
that is grounded in the rhetoric of ‘empowerment’ 
and ‘community-led’ development.14 Whilst the 
launch of this policy was greeted by many within 
the CBNRM community as a significant success 
on their behalf and as a significant opportunity 
(Arntzen et al. 2003; National CBNRM Forum 
2004), there appears to date to have been little 
effort made to capitalise on these opportunities.15 
Other recently introduced strategies and policies 
mirror this shift in approach. These include 
the 2002 Revised National Policy for Rural 
Development (Government of Botswana 2002) 
and the 2003 Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(Government of Botswana 2003a). Consequently, 
the policy framework provided by both the 
environmental and rural development sectors 
appears strong and conducive to CBNRM. 
Yet there appears to be a chasm between 
the rhetoric of these policy documents and 
practice, a chasm that the current controversy 
surrounding the CBNRM policy is bringing into 
sharp relief. Despite the apparently progressive 
policy framework, Arntzen (2004), Taylor (2000) 
and other observers note that there has been a 
notable lack of progress in implementation of 
these strategies. Implementation is constrained 
by the inherent contradictions of these policies 
with others affecting the rural sector, such 
as land/resource tenure, decentralisation and 
grazing. As the following discussion indicates, 
these policies are influenced by and continue to 
support the economic and political aspirations 
and domination of the Tswana governing elite 
and bring into question the government’s genuine 
commitment to community-based approaches. 
Contradictions in privatising the 
commons 
Due to the prominence of tribal communal lands 
(covering 71% of the land area),16 their use, 
productivity and management remain of central 
importance to the country and lie at the heart of 
rural development policy. The dominant form of 
land use in these areas is livestock farming, which 
has been at the centre of the Botswana economy 
for many centuries. Today the livelihoods of 
80% of the rural population are dependent on 
this sector, and it is the third largest foreign 
exchange earner (White 1998). Livestock also 
continues to play a central cultural role in that 
it is symbolic of the health of the agro-pastoral 
community and of the power of its dominant 
members (IIED 2004). 
The dominant policy approach today is 
that of privatising grazing lands,17 resulting in 
shrinking communal lands as fenced ranches (de 
jure private) and exclusive use of boreholes on 
rangelands (de facto private) expand.18 This is 
driven in part by the belief within the Ministry 
of Agriculture that communal rangelands 
were degraded, that degradation was caused 
by overgrazing, that overgrazing was caused 
by communal land ownership leading to open 
access, and that the solution was privatisation 
(IIED 2004). This belief in a ‘Tragedy of the 
Commons’ scenario engulfing the communal 
areas still dominates within the Ministry of 
Agriculture, providing the scientific rationale 
for the ongoing push for privatisation within 
communal areas (Alden-Wily 2003).
A further force for privatisation is overtly 
political. The ruling Botswana Democratic 
Party (BDP) has the support of and membership 
of many wealthy cattle owners and the links 
between government policy and benefits to 
this group appear clear (IIED 2004). Peters 
(1994:218) noted that ‘there is no doubt that 
some of the highly placed members of the 
government and party who promote the policy 
benefit directly as wealthy cattle and borehole 
owners’. This provides a strong incentive for 
driving government subsidy to the livestock 
sector and provides further incentives for national 
elites to expand their land accumulation for cattle 
pasturage. Whilst there is debate about the level 
of these subsidies (Alden-Wily 2003), there is 
general agreement that ‘government policies have 
made the livestock sector artificially attractive 
at the expense of other forms of land use’ (IIED 
2004:24).
Notwithstanding commitments in the National 
Development Plans (NDPs)19 to the contrary, 
government efforts to boost economic growth and 
diversify the economy have to date focused on 
the livestock sector at the expense of the wildlife 
and tourism sectors. 
Decentralisation and governance 
Whilst decentralisation does have a long history 
in Botswana,20 local government remains 
largely financially dependent upon central 
government and in most respects is subject to 
decisions made at the central level.21 Thus, local 
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government remains upwardly accountable 
to central government and not to its local 
electorate.22 There is debate concerning the 
political commitment of central government 
to decentralisation of authority to DCs rather 
than to local line ministries and yet, by regional 
standards, Botswana seems to have made 
significant progress. There is general agreement 
that local government has an excellent record in 
delivering key services such as water, education 
and health, and that local political processes 
are relatively well developed and democratic 
(Tordoff 1988; Wunsch 2003; Hitchcock 2003; 
Maundeni 2005).23 And yet, despite the relative 
strengths of DCs, the implementation approach 
adopted by the NRMP effectively marginalised 
them from CBNRM implementation.
Implementation approach and 
challenges
An important dimension in understanding the 
implementation of CBNRM is an examination of 
the philosophy, science and data underlying such 
an approach. There is growing recognition that 
decisions around natural resource management 
policy ultimately depend on the relative political 
influence of different interest groups (Keeley 
& Scoones 2003). CBNRM entails social and 
political commitments, and relies on particular 
audiences and practices to support it. The policy 
processes that shaped CBNRM are influenced by 
the existence of networks that seek to promote 
effective, participatory policy development. The 
history of CBNRM in southern Africa reveals 
that effective and influential actor networks, 
incorporating bureaucrats, local and national 
politicians, national and international civil 
society organisations, private sector actors in 
the tourism industry, and, to varying degrees, 
grassroots constituencies are critical factors in 
influencing the direction of CBNRM24 (Jones & 
Murphree 2001; Duffy 2000). These networks 
have to transcend disciplinary, ideological, racial, 
ethnic and political boundaries, and represent 
the uniting of diverse interest groups to derive 
benefits from the policy. 
Keeley and Scoones (2003) note that the 
relative influence each group is able to bring to 
bear on policy development will depend on a 
range of factors such as their economic power, 
political influence, the political climate and the 
issues being debated. In the context of Botswana, 
several factors have prevented the development 
of a strong, united and cohesive policy network 
supportive of CBNRM. One of these is that the 
economic interests of the political elite are not 
served by CBNRM, either because they prefer 
alternative land use options – cattle ranching 
– or because they have their own economic 
objectives for wildlife management. Related to 
this is the widely recognised hostility of Vice-
President Khama25 to the concept of sustainable 
use which underpins CBNRM, which has led to 
the development of a network actively hostile to 
it. Compounding this is that the foreign origins 
of CBNRM have affected the level of political 
support that can be mobilised in its support. 
Meanwhile, sidelining local government from 
the process has ensured that they too are not 
CBNRM advocates. Given this context, it is 
perhaps not surprising that CBNRM and the 
underlying principles on which it is based, such as 
sustainable use, are highly politicised and remain 
susceptible to arbitrary decisions of powerful 
politicians. 
Foreign origins of CBNRM and 
national dynamics
The origins of CBNRM in Botswana are foreign. 
This has significantly affected the nature of the 
network supporting the policy development 
process and played a determining role in how it has 
been integrated and received nationally. CBNRM 
was first introduced in Botswana by the United 
States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) in the form of the Botswana Natural 
Resource Management Programme (BNRMP), 
implemented from 1989 through 1999. After the 
end of the BNRMP, The World Conservation 
Union/Netherlands Development Organisation 
(IUCN/SNV) CBNRM Support Programme 
assumed centre stage, followed by the European 
Union-funded Wildlife Conservation and 
Management Programme in 2002.26  Whilst each 
of these programmes was/is embedded within 
and/or worked hand in hand with DWNP, the 
lead implementing government institution, 
CBNRM remains identified with donor agencies 
and the expatriate personnel who managed 
the programme.27 It is then perceived to be 
an imported environmental paradigm28 which 
has compromised its relevance and legitimacy 
locally. Consequently, the philosophy, science 
and data underlying CBNRM approaches lack 
‘indigenous’ conceptualisation and development. 
Evidence from other southern African countries 
demonstrates that it has taken years, and the 
involvement of many diverse individuals and 
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institutions, for CBNRM approaches to develop 
and reflect unique social and political realities 
and commitments (see Jones & Murphree 
2001 for a comprehensive discussion). The 
result is a lack of cultural understanding, 
relationships, identities and connection to 
social and political networks, arising from the 
difficulty of embedding foreigners in the local 
institutional landscape. This has presented 
CBNRM with immense implementation and 
operational challenges. Foreign dominance is 
reflected in the term informally used to describe 
CBNRM within DWNP, Dilo tsa Makgoa, which 
translates to ‘Something for the white people’. As 
one DWNP official (name withheld on request) 
commented: 
CBNRM is just one more approach 
introduced by well-meaning donors who 
are following fashions. The history of 
development here is full of them and, 
like those, it will fade away when all the 
donors and foreign experts have gone 
(Anonymous 1, pers. comm.).
This lack of ‘indigenous’ roots, compounded by 
the lack of continuity in its implementation, has 
translated into limited legitimacy locally and 
nationally and has compromised the development 
of a strong CBNRM network.29 This manifests 
itself in the remarkable absence of a politically 
salient constituency at any level, and there is 
a notable lack of community representatives, 
politicians, local NGO ‘personalities’, leading 
academics and senior managers and conservation 
practitioners in DWNP among its supporters. 
CBNRM here is therefore largely bereft of 
effective ‘champions’ who can influence policy 
making. This failure to develop an influential 
network makes it relatively easy to discard once 
donors withdraw their support. 
The perception of CBNRM as an externally 
imposed approach at the national level is mirrored 
also at the local level, where the ‘imposer’ 
is perceived to be the DWNP and NGOs. As 
expressed by one Member of Parliament (MP): 
In theory, CBNRM is a great idea and 
just what we need. It promotes self-
reliance and self-sufficiency and makes 
people value and conserve resources. 
But it is being imposed on people. The 
participatory elements are being ignored 
as they’re too difficult to implement. And 
this destroys the whole purpose (Buteti, 
pers. comm.).
Institutional landscape 
Throughout the 1990s and to date, DWNP 
has been the lead agency in terms of policy 
development and technical support for CBNRM. 
Other government departments and ministries, 
the ARB, land boards and DCs play a limited role. 
There is consensus that CBNRM implementers 
largely failed to engage and be integrated 
with sectoral initiatives in other ministries or 
departments (Taylor 2000; Arntzen et al. 2003; 
Jones 2004). The role played by other government 
agencies, notably the DCs, was determined by the 
BNRMP to be that of ‘facilitators of a process and 
guarantors of a fair an honest process’ (N. Winer, 
pers. comm.). It was a well-meaning attempt to 
avoid what was perceived to be the primary pitfall 
of the CAMPFIRE programme:
[D]ecentralising to councils, as in 
Zimbabwe, was seen by us as using wildlife 
to provide a subsidy to local government 
which then passed on a percentage, 
under imposed terms and conditions, to 
communities (N. Winer, pers. comm.). 
However, from 2003 this tactical response to 
the experience and problems of CBNRM in 
Zimbabwe has been viewed as a tactical error by 
implementers in Botswana. Proscribing the role 
of DCs has effectively marginalised them from 
the programme, which has proved a handicap in 
promoting local governance and accountability 
(National CBNRM Forum 2004).
The failure of the BNRMP to develop a strong 
and diverse implementation base among local 
institutions early on seems to have compounded 
the problems of marginalisation from mainstream 
policy-making processes. It was not until the 
late 1990s that Botswana begun to witness the 
diversification and strengthening of the CBNRM 
institutional landscape. Only when the BNRMP 
was terminated in 1999, was it recognised that 
there was need to ensure continuity and to create 
national-level institutions that would represent the 
interests of the growing number of CBOs. At this 
point, USAID was instrumental in the creation of 
a national umbrella and networking organisation 
for CBOs, the Botswana Community-based 
Organisation Network (BOCOBONET) (O. 
Chapayama, pers. comm.).
During the period 1999–2003, implementers 
made concerted efforts to develop an influential 
constituency that would overcome the political 
isolation of CBNRM as well as create a well-
organised, cohesive stakeholder group. The 
IUCN/SNV CBNRM Support Programme30 
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was primarily responsible for and oversaw the 
development which led to the creation of a 
cohesive local interest group representing all 
stakeholders, including local communities.31 
In 1999, this network consisted of a total of 
35 institutions (IUCN/SNV 2000), and by 
2003, it had grown to 83 CBOs, 8 government 
departments (local and national); 10 local and 
international NGOs; 58 private sector and NGO 
‘service providers’; 12 private sector companies 
and their associations; and various international 
donors (National CBNRM Forum 2004). 
From 2000 to 2003, regular national CBNRM 
conferences involving all stakeholders were 
held, as well as bi-annual forum and steering 
committee meetings.
The CBNRM Review (Arntzen et al 2003:12) 
was able to conclude that:
through the efforts of BOCOBONET 
and the CBNRM Forum Structures, a 
significant proportion of wildlife-based 
CBOs have participated in the policy 
dialogue and have played an active role 
in lobbying and advocacy on issues of 
importance to CBNRM. Stakeholders 
have become a movement with different 
interests but a common goal.
The extent of the political influence of this 
network was clearly demonstrated by the 
effective manner in which it was able to block the 
Ministry of Local Government’s SAVINGRAM 
of 2001. This SAVINGRAM represented the 
first overt signs of opposition by government 
to the devolutionary processes inherent within 
CBNRM. Its aim was to overturn the devolution 
of financial control of resources to CBOs and 
create an alternative process of decentralisation 
by vesting this authority with DCs (Molale 2001). 
The swift and well-choreographed response 
from the National CBNRM Forum, steering 
committee and individual institutions, notably 
BOCOBONET, led to the eventual withdrawal 
of the SAVINGRAM.
However, following these initial successes, 
a series of events began to undermine the 
ability of the stakeholder group to function 
as a lobby/advocacy group. The result is that 
today, the strong CBNRM constituency that 
seemed apparent in the early 2000s is no longer 
fully functional or supportive of CBNRM, 
significantly undermining the political strength 
of its constituency. A comparison of the reaction 
of the government to the demands from the 
CBNRM Forum in 2001 and 2005 reflects a 
dramatic shift in political influence. In 2001, the 
government agreed to the Forum providing input 
into the finalisation of the policy, and the outcome 
that was adopted wholeheartedly reflected the 
Forum’s recommendations, with the Permanent 
Secretary, Ministry of Environment, Wildlife 
and Tourism, noting that the policy framework 
must explicitly address the management of the 
proceeds from the programme as lobbied for by 
the forum.
The response from the Permanent Secretary 
on what is essentially the same issue to a May 
2005 submission from the Forum was: 
It must be understood that policy is 
developed by government, taking the views 
of all stakeholders into consideration not 
just those of a special interest group such 
as the National CBNRM Forum might 
represent (L. Gakale, pers. comm.). 
The process that unfolded post-2001 reflects 
shifts in the balance of power between the various 
actors. Shifts in the interests, intentions and 
resources of actors, and their influence on power, 
stimulated changes in the policy environment and 
outcomes. Growth of a ‘backlash’ to CBNRM 
became apparent and was accentuated by other 
external forces that weakened it still further. 
Alienation of donors and the private 
sector 
Donor withdrawal in 2003 had a significant 
impact by undermining the donor-dependent 
NGOs supporting CBNRM. For example, the 
CBNRM Support Programme itself was no longer 
supported by SNV. BOCOBONET has had to 
refocus its activities on ‘rural development’ in 
general and since 2003 has played a marginal 
role in CBNRM (A. Mabei, pers. comm.). Several 
formerly active NGOs, such as the Forestry 
Association of Botswana, collapsed. Others 
withdrew, including the Agency for Co-operation 
and Research in Development (ACORD). The 
net result is a weakened stakeholder group and 
increasing problems of accountability within 
CBOs.32
Meanwhile, the private sector continues to 
alienate itself from CBNRM, and has become a 
vocal and influential critic on the grounds that 
there is a prevalence of incidents of misuse and 
abuse of funds by CBOs and lack of reinvestment 
in the resource base by communities. Narratives 
of mismanagement by communities abound 
among the private sector. These perceptions 
have recently culminated in the withdrawal 
of the influential private sector representative 
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association, the Hotel and Tourism Association 
of Botswana (HATAB), from the CBNRM 
Forum. 
The ‘diamonds debate’
The high-profile, national political and economic 
controversy concerning use of revenue from 
natural resources and minerals (particularly 
diamonds) has also influenced perspectives. 
The Constitution of Botswana states that all 
natural resources are national assets and that all 
proceeds must go to national coffers to ensure 
transparent and equitable distribution. MPs 
from diamond-rich areas have drawn attention 
to CBNRM, arguing that if exceptions are 
made for wildlife, by allowing direct return 
of financial benefits to producer communities, 
then the principle must apply to diamonds. This 
argument has significant national political and 
economic ramifications and has drawn attention 
from the President down, expressing concern that 
the wildlife sector is setting a precedent for the 
whole economy and that the exception made for it 
is anti-constitutional. In view of this controversy, 
political expediency requires that both diamonds 
and wildlife be declared ‘national resources’, 
undermining the rationale for CBNRM and the 
basis upon which it operates. 
San controversies 
The controversy over the relocation of the San 
from the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) 
has alienated this already marginalised ethnic 
group even further from mainstream political and 
social discourse and public sympathies.33 Whilst 
it is not officially acknowledged, it is widely 
known that the majority of the beneficiaries 
of CBNRM in Ngamiland are San. This lack 
of public sympathy for the San is reflected in 
a lack of public outcry over the prospective 
loss of benefits that they receive from wildlife 
management under CBNRM.
These findings indicate that the CBNRM 
stakeholder group in Botswana played a key role 
in the short tem as a political counterweight to 
demands from the political economic elite for 
recentralisation. However, shifts in the balance 
of power ensured that this group was largely 
marginalised from national political processes, 
whilst CBNRM was becoming increasingly 
embattled in controversy due to problems of 
mismanagement, abuse of funds, implementation 
problems, and other factors outside its control, 
such as the ‘diamonds debate’ and the political 
alienation of San communities. This demonstrates 
that the lack of a strong, politically salient 
constituency at all levels compromises the social 
and political sustainability of CBNRM. Further 
light is shed on the lack of a political constituency 
in rural Botswana by a review of local-level 
devolutionary dynamics. 
Problems of accountability 
Devolution of powers to local-level institutions 
is a critical element in CBNRM and requires that 
local-level institutions are genuinely accountable 
to and representative of the interests of their 
members (Ribot 2002; Murphree 2000; WRI 
2005). In Botswana, there is consensus that CBOs 
are marked by low levels of accountability and 
poorly represent their local constituents (Arntzen 
et al. 2003; Habarard 2003; Zuze 2004; Mbaiwa, 
2004a; Thakadu 2005). 
Murphree (2004:5) identifies conditions for 
the development of constituent accountability. 
These include: 
Firstly, local jurisdictions need to be able 
to organize and act collectively.
Secondly, they need to embody, in principle 
and practice, an ideal that corresponds 
to a general public ethos that confers 
political legitimacy. 
The following section explores whether these 
conditions have developed at the local level, if 
not, why not, and what has been the impact on 
the policy process. Habarad (2003) and Thakadu 
(2005) note lack of accountability as particularly 
evident in CBOs with concession-based joint 
venture partnerships (JVPs). Given the huge 
amount of money and influence generated by 
these ventures, the stakes are high for those 
who would control them, particularly so when 
mechanisms for ensuring accountability are 
flawed or absent. Consequently, the high-value 
resources involved in those CBOs with JVPs 
create unique problems not prevalent in other 
CBOs focusing on veld resources with relatively 
little economic value.34 Wildlife-related CBOs 
are the high-profile ‘flagships’ of CBNRM, 
and are those affecting policy debates. Based 
on findings from CBOs engaged in wildlife-
related JVPs, specifically the six CBOs located 
in Ngamiland, this section offers insights about 
devolution, with the objective of illuminating 
shifts in the policy process. 
Community control and benefits 
Community control over the material benefits 
of CBNRM is a contentious issue, as the degree 
14
Devolution and democratisation of natural resource management in southern Africa: 
A comparative analysis of CBNRM policy processes in Botswana and Zimbabwe
to which financial powers have been genuinely 
transferred to communities is questionable, given 
the lack of accountability and representation by 
CBOs. As Arntzen et al. (2003:19) in a national 
review conclude: 
real empowerment is yet to be achieved. 
The transfer of power has by and large been 
to the Boards or governance structures of 
organizations. 
In other words, devolution has frequently 
delivered financial decision-making powers and 
benefits into the hands of small village elites, 
rather than into the hands of community members 
in general. This has resulted in relatively high 
levels of mismanagement, and misuse and abuse 
of the finances and financial powers devolved to 
CBOs. For example, in Ngamiland, the heartland 
of CBNRM in Botswana, as of 2004, there were 
17 CBOs, 6 of which had JVPs (Mbaiwa 2004b). 
Allegations relating to mismanagement or abuse 
of funds have been made against each of these 
since they were first established, although there 
is considerable variation in the degrees of abuse. 
Independent auditors have substantiated most of 
these allegations, although no prosecutions have 
been embarked on to date. Table 1 provides a 
Table 1: CBOs with JVPs in Ngamiland 
Name of the 
trust 





372 1 497 281 Yes Accountable trust ensures 
participation; no reports of financial 
irregularities. However, CBO unable 
to work with private sector, leading 
to alienation and it no longer being 





395 5 500 728 No Mismanagement of funds (over 
P2 000 000 unaccounted for); no 




6 431 8 589 766 No Co-option by elites; unconfirmed 
misappropriation of P430 000; no 
community involvement or benefit; 
high administrative overheads; lack of 






6 486 568 No Misappropriation of P12 500 
in 2002; limited community 
participation and benefit; high 
administrative overheads; lack of 









Misappropriation of P20 000 
in 2002; limited community 
participation or benefit prior to this. 
Since 2002 the new leadership has 









P99 461 misappropriated in 
2002; limited community benefit 
or participation prior to this. Since 
2002 the new leadership has 
improved the situation. 
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– and not surprisingly the individuals 
pushing it were the MP and the operator, 
who got on board a few powerful local 
residents. Local participation and needs 
had nothing to do with it (Anonymous 2, 
pers. comm.). 
Established in essence by the local MP, the 
safari operator and a lawyer, and guided by 
their constitution, the OCT became the de facto 
owner of the wildlife resources in its area. The 
only natural resource management activity in 
which the trust is currently involved in is that of 
subleasing its CHA and selling its wildlife quotas 
to the same operator. DWNP (2000:3), aware of 
the problems within OCT, noted that:
there is apparently strong private sector 
and political influences over the board 
activities and decisions and in the 
process of establishing this, members 
have been excluded from any meaningful 
participation in the trust's activities.
In an attempt to address these problems, ACORD, 
in partnership with DWNP and Tawana Land 
Board, began a programme of institutional 
strengthening and general awareness in 2001. 
This process led to increased awareness of their 
rights by general community members, who 
began to question the decisions of the OCT 
board members. This culminated in a delegation 
of disaffected community representatives 
to the district commissioner to express their 
dissatisfaction with the way things were run 
(ACORD 2002). Prompting this delegation was 
the trust’s decision to renew the JVP with the 
existing safari operator, ignoring the wishes 
of the broader community for an open tender 
process. At this point, the commissioner sought 
the support of the Minister of Commerce and 
Industry, who wrote a directive instructing OCT 
to opt for an open tender. The response from 
OCT, advised by its lawyer, was to invoke its 
legal rights as stipulated in its constitution to 
make decisions on behalf of the community 
(ACORD 2002).
In the face of this legal interpretation of 
the constitution and status of the CBO, the 
minister withdrew her directive. Soon after, 
in 2003, ACORD withdrew from the country, 
leaving the OCT board intact and once again 
in control of the local process. The response 
from the local government authorities was one 
of resignation. Representatives of the local 
villages had approached the local authorities 
– as their legitimate, democratic representatives 
– in an attempt to elicit their support in resolving 
brief overview of the situation in all six CBOs. 
A more detailed look at the history and 
implementation of CBNRM initiatives in two 
of the participating communities highlights 
the nature of the problems that are being 
encountered. 
Okavango Community Trust (OCT) 
OCT, the first CBO in Ngamiland, was registered 
in March 1995, with the objective of representing 
the interests of the five villages of Seronga, 
Gunotsoga, Eretsha, Beetsha and Gudigwa on 
issues relating to the concession areas NG 22 
and NG 23 (ACORD 2002). Its establishment 
was politically motivated, resulting in a hasty 
process that prohibited community participation 
from the start (ACORD 2002). Following the 
establishment of the first CBNRM initiative in 
Chobe in 1994, the MP for Okavango North, 
in collaboration with a local safari operator, 
approached DWNP with a demand that CBNRM 
projects be established in his area, following 
which the NRMP staff were directed to proceed 
immediately and undertake community briefing 
and mobilisation meetings (O. Thakadu & N. 
Winer, pers. comm.). The MP and representatives 
of the safari operator then accompanied the 
NRMP team through the initial awareness-raising 
stages of the mobilisation process. On returning to 
the area one month later to complete the process 
and prior to the registration of any CBOs, OCT 
had already signed a contract entering into a joint 
venture with the safari operator, Michelleti Bates, 
(Hartly 1995) and a constitution had been drawn 
up for the trust by a lawyer in consultation with 
the MP, but with no consultation with community 
members. ACORD and other observers point out 
that this represents a weak foundation upon which 
to build a community-driven initiative (ACORD 
2002). ACORD (2002:9) concludes that:
it was, as it were, driven to them…locals 
did not readily accept the trust as theirs, 
neither were they fully aware of its 
functions, nor did they participate in its 
activities.
Other interpretations of the process are less 
circumspect. As one of those involved in the 
implementation process at the time (name 
withheld on request) noted:
the establishment of the OCT was for two 
purposes and driven by two individuals. 
The purposes were to gain votes for the 
MP whilst lining his pocket because of the 
favourable terms of the agreement with the 
operator – it never even went out to tender 
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issues of non-accountability (DC personnel 
[names withheld on request], pers. comm.). 
The DC, in collaboration with local DWNP 
staff, had responded appropriately, undertaking 
a comprehensive consultative process and 
negotiations in all five villages lasting several 
months (ACORD 2002). Armed with considerable 
insights and knowledge, they then invoked the 
support of the minister in addressing the problem, 
only to be rebuffed on legal grounds and to be 
told that they had no right to intervene. 
Meanwhile, the OCT trustees continue to 
award themselves sitting allowances of P640 
each for each of the four scheduled meetings 
a year and a further P100 for unscheduled 
meetings. A large portion of the trust’s funds is 
spent on project administration and personnel 
costs or invested in business ventures that have 
no community involvement (Mvimi et al. 2003; 
Zuze 2004; Mbaiwa 2004a). Local discontent 
with the selection of the safari operator and the 
lack of community participation in decisions in 
general continues. Reports to DWNP indicate that 
an amount of P430 000 is unaccounted for from 
the financial year 2002 (Anonymous 1 [name 
withheld on request], pers. comm.). This situation 
is summed up as follows by one DC officer (name 
withheld on request): 
Members of the OCT trust are in alliance 
with national politicians and local 
councillors and have formed a power block. 
They’re in control and able to circumvent 
any procedures. They’ve shown they can 
beat the minister and tell her to stay out of 
their affairs, so all government personnel 
now stay away. The same operator has 
recently renewed the contract, although 
now there are new problems. We just had 
another delegation from the community, 
but we can’t do anything. We are only 
allowed to advise through our role on the 
TAC [Technical Advisory Committee]. If 
the trust chooses to ignore our advice they 
can and do (Anonymous 3, pers. comm.).
The profound impact of this situation is borne 
out in research conducted by Mvimi et al. (2003) 
in two OCT villages, the objective of which was 
to identify the communities’ perceptions and 
understanding of their CBNRM initiatives. By 
the time this research was undertaken, the five 
villages of OCT, with a total population of 6 431, 
had received almost P7 000 00035 from their 
CBNRM initiatives. This research showed that 
whilst 86% of respondents indicated that they 
had heard about CBNRM during the consultation 
process, they had lost track of it as the clash 
between the DC, MP and lawyer progressed. 
Only 14% had any relationship with the project 
since its initiation. The study further revealed that 
only 32% of people perceived that the community 
in general had benefited from the project; this 
dropped to 2% in terms of benefits from social 
services or infrastructural developments. Eighty 
per cent of respondents indicated that their 
expectations of the project had not been met 
and that this was due ‘to poor leadership…
mismanagement and misappropriation of funds’ 
(Mvimi et al. 2003:92). 
Khwai Development Trust (KDT)
Khwai36 is a small village of 395 people from 
the Babukakhwae or ‘River Bushmen’ ethnic 
group. It is situated next to Moremi Game 
Reserve in the Okavango. Despite Khwai being 
one of the first villages encouraged to participate 
in CBNRM, it was among the last villages to 
implement it. Delays arose as the village wanted 
a concession for Basarwa only, an approach that 
was unacceptable to the government as it was 
discriminatory. This delayed the registration of 
the trust until 2000. 
Natural resource management activities 
include marketing of hunts, subsistence hunting 
for part of their quota, grass and crafts marketing, 
and community campsites. From 2000 to 2003, 
Khwai realised over P3 000 000 from land 
rentals to its JVP. Throughout this period, the 
CBO, Khwai Development Trust (KDT), had an 
extremely poor track record in managing, using 
and accounting for these funds (National CBNRM 
Forum 2004). According to the trust’s accountant 
– appointed only after 2003 – over P2 000 000 
remain unaccounted for from this period, and the 
trustees, who were voted out of office at the end 
of 2003, were being investigated by the police 
(I. Hancock, pers. comm.). Mismanagement 
of those funds that are accounted for have also 
characterised the workings of the trust. In 2003, 
the KDT trust members, in consultation with 
the community, decided to maximise financial 
returns and maintain independence by marketing 
their own quota. To achieve this, four KDT 
trust members visited New York. No prior 
arrangements had been made and no marketing 
strategy developed. Encountering problems 
of cultural and geographical disorientation, as 
well as having no networks or knowledge of the 
safari industry, the group was unsuccessful in 
its marketing endeavours. Whilst no firm figures 
are available, a conservative estimate of the 
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cost of this failed marketing strategy is between 
P200 000 and P300 000. More significantly, 
the value of the quota for that year, potentially 
several million pula, went unrealised (I. Hancock, 
pers. comm.). 
In 2003, as a result of the failure of KDT to 
present audited accounts to DWNP for the third 
year in a row, and in the face of clear evidence of 
abuse and mismanagement, DWNP withheld the 
quota for 2004 pending an investigation (National 
CBNRM Forum 2004). Following this decision, 
representatives from KDT travelled to Gaborone 
and met powerful senior members of the ruling 
party to appeal for the return of their quota. 
Initially this appeal was denied but in July 2004, 
just prior to the national elections in August, the 
Minister of Environment and Tourism and the 
new BDP candidate MP for Kasane District (in 
which Khwai is situated) undertook a political 
rally in Khwai. During his stump speech, the 
BDP candidate produced the quota and returned 
it to the people. The following month, the BDP 
candidate was successful in his bid to win the 
Kasane seat. There is clear evidence that the 
Khwai community, which for the previous 15 
years had supported the opposition Botswana 
Alliance Movement, switched its support to the 
BDP in these elections. 
This incident is openly discussed and widely 
interpreted within DWNP, the DC and NGOs 
to have been an overt case of politicians 
manipulating CBNRM procedures for political 
gain. Wildlife quotas become a means by which 
politicians can dispense patronage and develop 
their client base both at the local level (Khwai and 
the MPs are beholden to each other) and at the 
national level (the MP is beholden to individuals 
at the most senior levels of his party). Neither is 
it an isolated incident; several similar examples 
are commonly recounted. 
Whilst the gross abuse and mismanagement 
of funds of the earlier years have now been 
brought under control with the introduction of 
an external accountant and the election of new 
trust members, there is still clear evidence of 
limited abuses of funds and mismanagement of 
projects (I. Hancock, pers. comm.). Hancock 
(pers. comm.) notes that the impact within the 
village of this process has been profound:
I can’t speak for the people of Khwai, 
but I spend a lot of time there and in my 
experience the majority of those within 
Khwai who aren’t on the board of trustees 
would tell you that CBNRM should be 
scrapped. It’s brought them nothing 
but trouble, fighting and arguments 
within what was previously a cohesive 
community, now their sons and daughters 
face jail and public disgrace, and in return 
for all this they have nothing. 
To put this into perspective, Khwai is a village 
of 395 people whose income from CBNRM 
activities, despite management shortcomings, 
exceeded P4 000 000 for the period 2000 to 
2004, representing a potential per capita income 
of P10 126. 
Cgaecgae Tlhabololo Trust (CTT)
Whilst OCT and Khwai are generally recognised 
as the CBOs with the worst track record in 
Ngamiland, the situation in three of the other 
four is not dissimilar and all encounter significant 
problems relating to financial accountability or 
mismanagement of funds, as Table 1 illustrates. 
The only CBO that appears to have largely evaded 
problems of accountability is that of Cgaecgae 
Tlhabololo Trust (CTT). Mvimi et al. (2003) 
indicate that it is the only one of the four CBOs 
they studied in which the majority of residents 
indicated that they benefited from the project and 
were involved in decision making. Interestingly, 
CTT has two features that distinguish it from the 
other CBOS. Firstly, they chose to avoid the use 
of the Khotla as the main forum for consultation 
because it would not ensure democratic and 
effective decision making (Mvimi et al. 2003), 
the implications of which are returned to below. 
Secondly, its average annual income was 
considerably less than those of others, with a 
maximum annual income of P342 262. This 
compares with OCT, on the other end of the scale, 
which earned P1 500 000. However, CTT has 
experienced significant problems managing its 
business initiatives and in relating to the private 
sector. The outcome – due in part to the paucity 
of its resource base but mainly to the perception 
of safari operators that it is not possible to work 
constructively with CTT – is that the trust is no 
longer able to find any operator prepared to enter 
into a JVP with it. The value of its quota is now 
going unrealised. From having earned P342 262 
in 2000, CTT has had no income since 2003. 
Emergence of positive examples 
Despite the hype and rhetoric around these cases 
in Botswana, the problems of accountability 
cannot be construed to mean that CBNRM has 
failed to contribute to the improvement of rural 
livelihoods. Mbaiwa (2004b) notes that almost all 
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CBOs have used funds to operate grocery stores 
in their villages, have vehicles for transportation, 
and provide financial and transport assistance 
to community members in case of death, and 
therefore offer important services for remote 
areas that would not otherwise be available. 
CBOs and their private sector partners have 
also generated significant local employment. 
According to Zuze (2004), approximately 175 
locals are employed directly by the six CBOs, 
whilst several hundred more are employed by 
the JVP. A further positive sign is that surveys 
carried out by Mbaiwa (2005) on community 
perceptions of wildlife indicate that throughout 
Ngamiland attitudes towards wildlife have been 
improving since the introduction of CBNRM. 
Perhaps most significantly, there are now 
several examples of CBOs that, after a few 
difficult years, are responding to the needs 
of their members and demonstrating both 
accountability and representation. These CBOs 
include the Sankuyo Tshwaragano Management 
Trust and the Mababe Zokotsama Community 
Development Trust (MZCDT), both of which 
have early years that resemble those of Khwai and 
OCT. Sankuyo provided cash handouts of P500 
in 2004 to each of its 49 member households, and 
has constructed ‘enviro-loos’ for each household 
and a community hall. It is planning to build 
houses for its destitute community members, 
provides a burial fund of P3 000 per adult and 
P1 000 per child and sponsors nine children 
to attend commercial school (Mbaiwa 2004b). 
Meanwhile MZCDT is undertaking similar 
projects and demonstrating that it is accountable 
to its constituency.37
Policy implications of lack of 
accountability 
Given the significant amounts generated within 
villages with total populations numbering only a 
few hundred, CBNRM is frequently critiqued for 
having too little to show for itself. Those CBOs 
that have been subject to serious allegations 
of misuse, fraud and mismanagement, such as 
OCT, KDT and CTT, have entered into CBNRM 
‘folklore’ and arm critics with evidence of the 
‘failure’ of CBNRM. These cases are advanced 
as the reason why communities should not be 
entrusted to manage CBNRM projects. This 
evidence of ‘failed’ CBNRM has had a profound 
impact at the policy level, and such ‘stories’ feed 
into the ongoing CBNRM policy process, resulting 
in the perception of CBNRM as inevitably 
entrenching corruption and leading to elite 
capture of benefits at the expense of the majority 
rural people. Problems of mismanagement 
and the capture of and manipulation of CBOs 
by elites have undermined the legitimacy of 
CBNRM among communities themselves.38 Such 
problems reflect the shortcomings of transferring 
financial powers without mechanisms to ensure 
accountability and representation are in place. To 
paraphrase Ribot (2002:3), ‘transferring power 
without accountable representation has proven 
dangerous’. Despite these problems, limited 
positive examples of CBNRM are emerging, 
but these are receiving little attention. Positive 
‘stories’ do not contribute to the interests of 
the political elite for whom it is more valuable 
to exploit failures. As the following section 
discusses, problems have largely resulted from 
an inappropriate and politicised implementation 
process, rather than from inherent flaws with the 
approach or the ability of communities to manage 
the process. 
Inattention to socio-political processes 
of empowerment 
From the beginning, the driving force for CBNRM 
was primarily conservation and environmental 
management, rather than social-political-
economic empowerment of rural communities. 
Mbaiwa (2004a, 2004b) and Cassidy (2000) 
note that economic benefits have been seen as 
a means to achieving conservation, not as an 
end in themselves, whilst social empowerment 
and community development issues were, until 
very recently, largely ignored. This bias towards 
conservation is understandable given the DWNP-
related genesis of CBNRM, whose primary 
mandate is managing wildlife resources. However, 
whilst expectations today have outgrown the 
original conservation role and encompass 
social, economic and equity objectives, the 
implementing agency’s architecture and mandate 
essentially remain the same. The lack of capacity 
in DWNP compromises its ability to deliver the 
empowering thrust of CBNRM in terms of local-
level governance and democracy. 
The first CBNRM project was started in 1993 
in the Chobe Enclave with the establishment 
of the Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust 
(CECT). Over the next few years five more were 
established in Ngamiland, and by 1997 there 
was a total of six CBOs. Since then, there has 
been huge, unanticipated growth in the number 
and distribution of CBOs. As of 2003, there 
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were 83 CBOs active in CBNRM, 67 of which 
were officially registered. These CBOs covered 
120 villages in 9 (out of 10) rural districts 
with an estimated population of 103 000, or 
approximately 6% of the national population. 
However, DWNP staff and resource commitments 
to enhance the capacity and monitoring of CBOs 
have not increased. As of 2005, a few dozen 
junior DWNP officials have responsibility for 
over a hundred CBOs.39 Of particular concern 
is that the mandate of DWNP has inadvertently 
resulted in implementation being largely focused 
on mobilising local communities to form trusts 
so that they gain quotas from DWNP and enter 
into JVAs with the private sector for trophy 
hunting or photographic tourism. Once the trust 
has been formed, most external support tends 
to focus on assisting the trust to secure a JVA 
without committing resources for building the 
capacity of CBOs to function independently 
in the long term. Rozemeijer and Van der Jagt 
(2000:6) argue that: 
DWNP does not have the resources 
for long-term facilitation and at times 
endorses the establishment of a trust with 
a quota knowing that it will not be able to 
provide the necessary follow-up, leaving 
behind a resource rich but institutionally 
puzzled community. 
Despite these shortcomings in capacity within the 
DWNP, it was not until the mid-1990s that the 
BNRMP made any effort to involve local NGOs. 
The role of DCs has been largely confined to that 
of advisors40 and the lack of a well-defined policy 
has prevented other government departments 
from committing scarce resources to what is 
broadly perceived to be the responsibility of 
DWNP. 
Perhaps the most significant source of long-
term accountability problems has been the 
method of community mobilisation adopted by 
DWNP as a result of their lack of experience 
with community mobilisation. Thakadu (2005), 
Habarad (2003) and others involved in the 
community mobilisation process in the 1990s 
question whether the mechanisms and strategies 
that were adopted for participation facilitate a 
community-driven process. Kgotla meetings 
exclude women and minority ethnic groups, 
youth and other marginalised groups (Magole 
2003) and are often very poorly attended, and 
cannot be characterised as democratic decision-
making institutions (Taylor 2000, Habarad 2003). 
Yet within the DWNP implementation strategy, 
‘The representative-ness and accountability of 
these structures [CBOs] was equated to elections 
conducted in a Kgotla meeting, which is deemed 
transparent and democratic’ (Thakadu 2005:203). 
By ensuring that the Kgotla plays the central 
role in mobilising communities, democratically 
representative processes were sidelined as 
mobilisation activities reinforced opportunities 
for elite capture of benefits and marginalisation 
of segments of the community.
The Kgotla example illustrates the problems 
and distortions of mobilisation and policy 
processes arising when the main implementing 
agency is under-resourced, inappropriately skilled, 
uncommitted and ill-equipped to handle complex, 
multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary 
interventions like CBNRM. By failing to 
facilitate the development of accountable CBOs, 
mismanagement and misuse of funds becomes 
a common feature, bringing into disrepute the 
concept of communities managing resources. 
Conclusion
Scrutiny of events relating to the development of 
the draft policy document in 2001, compared with 
the events of 2005/06, clearly reveals that ‘policy 
spaces’41 for both rural communities and civil 
society to influence policy have effectively closed 
in Botswana. Efforts to draft the policy have been 
ongoing for almost a decade. Initially the process 
was viewed as relatively inclusive, participatory 
and transparent (Cassidy 2003; IUCN 2004). 
Our research revealed that this process has now 
changed to one characterised by suppression of 
information and secrecy, clearly influenced by the 
political elite. Civil society’s ability to influence 
the policy process has diminished and it lacks 
the power it briefly demonstrated to reassert 
inclusive and transparent policy making. This 
diminishing of policy space can be attributed to 
the complex interplay of events. The outcome 
is that currently policy seems to be responding 
to the imperatives of politico-economic elites. 
The policy response of the central government 
to challenges has entailed projecting CBNRM 
as a ‘failure’, and using this as a justification 
to recentralise resource management. The call 
for recentralisation of resource management on 
the basis of ‘failure’ can be viewed in part as a 
smokescreen to cover up the political economic 
interests of these elites. 
The shortcomings of CBNRM in Botswana 
are largely associated with how it was introduced 
and implemented. The nature of rights granted 
to communities, institutional arrangements and 
20
Devolution and democratisation of natural resource management in southern Africa: 
A comparative analysis of CBNRM policy processes in Botswana and Zimbabwe
implementation mechanisms that were applied 
failed to ensure constituent accountability. At 
the same time, the implementation approach 
inhibited the involvement of other institutions 
that could have provided checks and balances 
leading to more equitable outcomes. DCs could 
have been important vehicles for empowering 
local communities to influence local governance 
and democratise resource management. The 
marginalisation of DCs as recognised legal 
governance structures threatened democratisation, 
local governance and empowerment of local 
communities. Where limitations in devolving 
power and authority to the lowest community level 
exist, creative opportunities for empowerment 
of local communities have to be explored 
within the legally recognised structures of local 
governance.
The failure of CBNRM institutions to be 
accountable and representative downwards is due 
in part to pressure for upward accountability and 
the reluctance of central government to devolve 
authority and proprietorship to local communities. 
But the implementation process in Botswana, by 
enabling elite capture of local-level benefits and 
processes, has also been in large part responsible 
for inhibiting the development of those conditions 
that Murphree (2004) identifies as necessary for 
the development of constituent accountability. 
On this basis, the devolution strategies that 
were adopted failed to cultivate incentives and a 
vibrant local political context which could ensure 
positive CBNRM outcomes.
The result has been the development of 
CBOs that are accountable to no one, neither 
local constituency nor state. Problems at a local 
level have provided the conditions to allow the 
process of policy development to be captured 
by the political economic elites whose interests 
are now dominant in the policy-making process. 
This situation was compounded by the demise 
of support for CBNRM from civil society, the 
political elite and local communities as a result 
of factors outside the control of implementers. 
The Botswana experience demonstrates 
that the lack of a strong, politically salient 
constituency compromises the social and 
political sustainability of CBNRM. Sustainability 
requires having appropriate actor networks 
in place at a national level, which function as 
constituencies that champion the interests of 
rural communities, thus shaping and – crucially 
– maintaining appropriate policy outcomes in 
the face of fluctuating political circumstances. 
A critical component of these networks will be 
communities themselves. A community-level 
constituency has not mobilised behind CBNRM 
as elite co-option has affected the flow of 
benefits to the broader community. Ironically, the 
marginalisation of rural people from the policy 
process seems to be occurring largely unopposed 
by communities. Never having significantly 
benefited, most rural dwellers seem disinterested 
when financial autonomy and the authority of 
CBOs are taken away. Thus, the process is a 
cyclical self-perpetuating one. Lack of political 
will to ensure appropriate policies should be 
anticipated when there is little if any constituency 
calling for such policies, a situation which will 
inevitably arise when CBNRM fails to deliver 
its anticipated outcomes due to implementation 
shortcomings.
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6. Case study 2: Zimbabwe
Background 
CBNRM was first introduced into Zimbabwe 
in the mid-1980s through the CAMPFIRE 
programme which was designed and introduced 
by the Department of National Parks and Wildlife 
Management (DNPWLM) in collaboration with 
other local institutions. CAMPFIRE provided 
much of the impetus for the replication of 
CBNRM approaches throughout the region. It 
also offered an arena through which the basic 
principles and concepts of CBNRM were 
established (Fabricius & Kock 2004; Child 
2004). Compromised versions of these concepts 
and principles have since been adopted in other 
countries in the region in the wildlife sector, and 
within Zimbabwe itself throughout the natural 
resource management sector.42
Today CAMPFIRE, whilst no longer 
maintaining the high national and international 
profile it attracted throughout the 1990s, is 
an entrenched component of Zimbabwe’s 
conservation and local government strategies, 
retaining political support at all levels. In 
order to entrench this support, CAMPFIRE 
implementers had to be pragmatic in their 
implementation and in policy development, by 
accommodating the concerns and perspectives 
of various different competing interest groups. 
This led to what Murphree (1997) terms 
‘strategic compromises’, the result of which was 
that several of the basic principles upon which 
CAMPFIRE was originally developed have had 
to be compromised. The outcome was a process 
and programme that created decentralised rather 
than devolved resource management structures. 
This has led many implementers and analysts to 
conclude that CAMPFIRE has been ‘co-opted’ 
by the rural district councils (RDCs) (Hammar 
2003; Bond 2001; Murombedzi 2003; Katerere 
2002; Shackleton & Campbell 2001; Dzingirai 
& Breen 2005). This case study traces the 
process of policy development, examining why 
this has led to political support and acceptance 
of CAMPFIRE and exploring whether the 
decentralised programme that has resulted does 
in fact undermine CAMPFIRE objectives, as 
conventional wisdom maintains. 
We examine CBNRM within the current 
context of Zimbabwe, a country which has 
undergone significant and far-reaching political, 
economic and social upheavals since the mid-
1980s, when CAMPFIRE was first introduced, 
and which has descended into ‘crisis’ since 2000. 
Its relatively strong economy has been reduced 
to one of the weakest globally, its once stable 
political conditions are now characterised by civil 
unrest and political repression, a previously well-
functioning bureaucracy is in tatters, and respect 
for basic democratic principles and human 
rights is no longer evident (Harold-Barry 2004; 
Hammar & Raftopoulos 2003). Zimbabwe, once 
a ‘darling’ of the international donor community, 
has become a pariah, no longer exhibiting the 
attributes of an ordered political polity (Chabal & 
Daloz 1999) in which political opportunities and 
resources are defined and codified by legislation 
or precedent. This decline had significant impacts 
on many different elements of CAMPFIRE, 
including the process of policy making, the 
economic benefits generated, donor or private 
investment, governance arrangements, and 
the implementation capacities of both NGOs 
and government agencies. And yet, despite an 
extremely difficult operating environment, some 




The realisation of CAMPFIRE-related financial 
revenue and economic incentives is linked to 
macroeconomic dynamics, and whether these 
allow for continuation or improvements in revenue 
generation, encourage revenue ‘capture’ by 
RDCs and political economic elites, or constrain 
opportunities for growth. The economic climate 
is equally important for the generation of revenue 
through private sector participation, concession 
leases and investments in tourism. The negative 
macroeconomic and political environment in the 
post-2000 period presents major challenges for 
CAMPFIRE revenue generation. Zimbabwe’s 
GDP plummeted 30% between 2000 and 2003, 
and the trend has accelerated (Dell 2005). With 
an inflation rate exceeding 4 500%, Zimbabwe 
has the highest rate of any country in the world. 
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Dell (2005) estimated that the proportion of the 
population living below the official poverty line 
had more than doubled since the mid-1990s, 
standing then at about 80%.
The political and economic turmoil has led to 
the collapse of the tourism sector. Nemarundwe 
(2005) highlights the negative impacts of this 
economic climate whereby CAMPFIRE’s 
income-generating potential through tourism is 
compromised and community investment projects 
are undermined as the fluctuation of prices 
makes a mockery of budgeting. Hyperinflation 
compromises the financial activities and economic 
viability of CAMPFIRE projects, erodes financial 
benefits and value, and, given that payments of 
household cash dividends from CAMPFIRE 
revenue activities take place six months to a 
year after activities have occurred, the losses to 
inflation of cash benefits are massive. Finally, 
in the absence of many other income or taxable 
options, the current situation is further increasing 
the dependence of RDCs on CAMPFIRE wildlife 
revenue for survival – a disincentive for fiscal or 
other devolution. 
Thus, the current hyper-inflationary 
macroeconomic environment is extremely 
disruptive. This is compounded further as the 
difficulties experienced by urban dwellers in 
securing employment contribute to urban-
rural migration, which increases pressure on 
the resource base, places further demands on 
revenues and applies new pressures to established 
local-level governance systems. 
Political characteristics
The extreme social and political problems of 
Zimbabwe can best be analysed and understood 
in the context of its history (Raftopoulos 2004). 
Zimbabwe emerged from almost a century of 
white rule, following a long and violent liberation 
war that ended in 1980, fought largely over 
land. Since 1980, the political priorities of the 
government have been dominated by reversing 
decades of racially biased inequalities in land, 
resource and asset distribution (Hammar & 
Raftopoulos 2003; Jones & Murphree 2001). As 
the ruling party slogan ‘The land is the economy, 
the economy is the land’ implies, struggles over 
land have been at centre stage throughout the 
colonial and post-colonial period. Since 2000, 
the mix of land and race has formed a volatile 
political cocktail dominating all aspects of 
economic, political and social life (Murombedzi 
& Gomera 2005). This struggle over land and its 
resources is central to understanding the political 
dimensions of natural resource management 
in Zimbabwe, explaining why it receives such 
a high degree of political prominence. The 
politically charged environment in which natural 
resource management finds itself has significant 
implications for CAMPFIRE. Wolmer et al. 
(2003:8) point out that wildlife management 
in general is viewed with suspicion, as it was 
considered to be ‘a ploy of whites to forestall land 
acquisition and justifying multiple and extensive 
land holdings’.
By the 1990s, it had become clear that the 
grand aims articulated by the state following 
independence had yet to be realised, poverty 
levels were increasing and new local governance 
arrangements were coming in for increasing 
criticism (Makumbe 1998). This brought into 
question the political legitimacy of ZANU-
PF, which came under increasing scrutiny, 
culminating in significant and escalating electoral 
challenges and civil unrest. The response 
on the part of the party-state was increased 
authoritarianism, violence and repression of 
political opposition, leading to the creation of a 
climate of fear and intolerance and a breakdown 
in the rule of law (Raftopoulos & Savage 
2005). Concerted efforts by the ruling party to 
consolidate rural support were undertaken. The 
most significant of these were the ‘Fast Track’ 
Land Reform Process and the 2001 Traditional 
Leaders Act. A further national feature since this 
time has been one of persistent political stalemate, 
whether internally between parties in Zimbabwe 
or in relation to regional or international efforts 
to facilitate political compromise or consensus to 
address the economic and humanitarian crisis. 
Civil society 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Zimbabwe 
witnessed the growth of a plethora of NGOs 
and a strong and vibrant civil society. NGOs 
received generous support from donors and 
worked to support government programmes, 
notably CAMPFIRE (Duffy 2000). The shift 
in the political landscape immediately prior 
to 2000 resulted in opposition by civil society 
organisations to government-led constitutional 
amendments. From 1999, some segments of 
civil society began to challenge the government 
on land, electoral and human rights issues. This 
began challenge was treated by the ruling party 
as a sign of political defiance, thereby warranting 
the repression of NGOs. In the process, the ruling 
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party and government spearheaded the NGO 
Bill, which aimed to suppress pressures seeking 
improved governance and democracy. The result 
was open conflict between the government and 
civil society. This volatile political climate 
translated into a difficult operational environment 
for civil society as it sought to challenge the 
status quo and push the government towards 
accountability and better governance. Notably, 
those components of civil society and associated 
social movements (such as the War Veterans) 
that are ideologically/politically aligned to the 
ruling party were given, and continue to receive, 
ad hoc audience and platforms to express their 
views and deliberate on issues within the public 
arena (Raftopoulos & Savage 2005).
The impact of this marginalisation of civil 
society on CAMPFIRE has been profound. 
Throughout the 1990s, members of the 
CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group (CCG) 
had played a key role in capacity building at 
grassroots level (Child et al. 2003) and fulfilled 
a critical role as ‘honest-brokers’, providing 
neutral arbitration in instances where community-
level polarisation stalled progress in programme 
implementation. As of 2003, NGOs and research 
institutions had effectively been marginalised 
from CAMPFIRE implementation, as their 
mandate from government to do so has been 
removed. Compounding this implementation 
marginalisation has been the loss of access to 
donor funding experienced by civil society 
throughout Zimbabwe as a result of donor 
withdrawal arising from the political situation. 
Policy context
Much of the colonial legislation and bureaucratic 
structures were inherited unaltered by the post-
colonial state (Mandondo 2000) and were highly 
centralised and ill-suited to accommodating 
popular demands. This general situation was 
mirrored in the field of environmental policy 
making, which remained largely unchanged from 
colonial times through the 1980s and 1990s. 
Mandondo (2000:1) describes the continuation in 
policy-making practices as ‘amendments to date 
that have largely de-racialised the colonial acts 
and policies without democratising them’.
Despite concerns with the nature of 
the bureaucracy in Zimbabwe, the country 
nevertheless had a relatively well-functioning 
and effective bureaucracy until 2000. After 
this period the situation changed dramatically, 
as described by one former senior government 
official (name withheld on request): 
Since the turmoil started in about 2000, 
Zimbabwe’s bureaucracy hasn’t functioned 
because it wasn’t clear who was in charge, 
where power or authority lay. Bureaucrats 
were unable to function because we were 
unsure who we would have to answer to or 
who we would offend in the process. The 
result was that no one made any decisions 
or took any actions (Anonymous 4, pers. 
comm.). 
Once again this has had a profound effect 
on CAMPFIRE. CAMPFIRE is based on 
principles of sustainable use (SASUSG 1995). 
The discourse that underlies sustainable use 
has solid scientific and rational underpinnings. 
It is primarily a technical exercise, with the 
primary goal of economic productivity and 
maintenance of the resource base. The resulting 
implementation approach assigned key regulatory 
and monitoring functions to technical arms of the 
state, in the form of the DNPWLM – now the 
Wildlife Management Authority (WMA) – to 
ensure environmental sustainability. However, 
the scientific approach that drove policy making 
has now been replaced by a racially charged and 
politically biased populist moral discourse about 
the return of ‘African soil to Africans’ adopted 
by the ruling party.43
The result of this radical shift in how policy 
is developed and implemented in the wildlife 
management context is that the WMA’s ability 
to regulate and monitor resource use and 
provide programme oversight has largely been 
undermined – as to do so could lead to retribution 
from powerful political forces. The leading 
role that powerful ruling party politicians have 
assumed within the wildlife management industry 
in Zimbabwe (a major source of rare foreign 
exchange) has been the subject of national and 
international media coverage (see Hammer 
2006). 
For the last five years, then, issues of land 
reform and redistribution have dominated the 
policy and political context in rural areas. This 
presents a very different context, dominated by 
political discourses that are rooted in different 
models of development, than that evident in 
the traditional wildlife management discourse 
which provided the background for CBNRM 
policy development in Zimbabwe. As Wolmer 
et al. (2003:1) note, ‘the land reform exercise 
emphasises direct redistribution, equity and 
land for crops; whilst the wildlife management 
discourse tends to stress the neo-liberal goals 
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of maximising foreign exchange earnings, 
encouraging public-private partnerships and 
trickle down’ as well as private sector involvement 
in the wildlife sector. The shift in the policy-
making environment, rationale and priorities, 
from one dominated by linear and science-based 
technical arguments to one driven by political 
expediency, racial bias and a host of competing 
political interests, represents a fundamental shift 
in the context in which CAMPFIRE is being 
played out. Any current analysis of CAMPFIRE 
and the policy environment in which it operates 
should be cognisant of this. 
Wildlife and conservation policies
CAMPFIRE is philosophically premised on 
sustainable use of natural resources, which was 
formally endorsed in Zimbabwe by the 1975 
Parks and Wildlife Act for private landholders, 
with an amendment in 1986 which designated 
RDCs as ‘appropriate authorities’ (AA) over 
wildlife on communal land. 
The institutional framework for CAMPFIRE 
and for rural development in general was 
provided by the prime minister’s directive 
of 1984, which established structures for 
development at provincial, district, ward and 
village levels. At a sub-district level, the Village 
Development Committees (VIDCOs) and Ward 
Development Committees (WADCOs) were 
created, neither of which can be constituted into 
legal entities. The RDC itself is the only elected 
body at district level that has a legal identity and 
was/is therefore the only institution within which 
AA can be legally vested. 
Rural-related policies 
Rural development has been one of the 
priorities of the Zimbabwean government since 
independence, and decentralisation was seen 
as a key means to achieve this (Hammar 2003; 
Makumbe 1998; Conyers 2001). Consequently, 
natural resource legislation in Zimbabwe 
concentrated considerable power in the hands of 
RDCs. In addition to the Parks and Wildlife Act, a 
number of other laws give the RDCs control over 
natural resources, such as the Natural Resources 
Act, the Communal Land Act and the Rural 
District Council Act.44 The Traditional Leaders 
Act (TLA) of 2001 has significant, if unclear, 
implications for both RDCs and CAMPFIRE. 
Until this date, policy had strengthened the role 
and legal legitimacy of the democratically elected 
structures at village, ward and district levels at 
the expense of traditional authorities. The TLA 
is a significant shift in direction, restoring powers 
to chiefs, headmen and sabhukus in terms of 
natural resource management. The Act, while 
seeking to empower traditional authorities, can 
potentially have problematic consequences for 
rural communities, especially where traditional 
leadership views values of democracy and 
governance as western ideals. Given this context, 
the ability of CBNRM to open up political 
space for democratisation, accountability 
and representation will be limited. The TLA 
is essentially a replica of colonial strategies 
pertaining to traditional leadership, the aim of 
which was (is) to co-opt traditional leadership 
to ensure political penetration of the state and 
ruling party into rural landscapes. The profound 
influence that this newly formed alliance of party 
and traditional institutions can have on local 
power dynamics and how this reverberates within 
local CAMPFIRE institutions is illustrated by the 
Mahenye case study below. 
Decentralisation 
CAMPFIRE was one of the first practical 
attempts at a decentralisation strategy in 
Zimbabwe, although Conyers (2001) notes that 
it developed relatively independently of the wider 
decentralisation debates and processes. Whilst it 
was not the original intent of CAMPFIRE policy 
makers, its effect has been to decentralise authority 
to manage wildlife resources to RDCs, not, as 
originally intended, to devolve authority to sub-
district institutions. Consequently, the situation 
of the RDCs is of fundamental importance in 
determining CAMPFIRE outcomes. As of 2000, 
responsibility for the provision of many services 
had been decentralised to RDCs, but the financial 
resources to execute these responsibilities had not 
been decentralised. Bond (2001) demonstrates 
that in RDCs with AA, central government grants 
accounted for 35% of total revenue with 65% 
being generated locally. Of these, in ten cases, 
income to the RDCs from wildlife management 
exceeded all other locally generated revenue. 
Given the deteriorating financial situation of the 
RDCs and the increasing demands upon them, the 
dependence on CAMPFIRE revenues has become 
ever more pronounced in the intervening years. 
From 1999 the government has been trying 
to ‘pass the buck of its financial and political 
problems’ (Conyers 2001:4) to RDCs as a 
result of the growing inability of ministries to 
deliver services. Decentralisation was seized 
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upon as a means to save the ruling party from 
the embarrassment of being unable to deliver 
basic services. This decentralisation of functions 
without financial resources to execute them, 
combined with a withdrawal of donor support 
in the early 2000s and the declining national 
economic situation, is detracting from the role 
of RDCs and reducing the quality of services 
provided. The unintended result has been further 
dependence of RDCs on wildlife revenue. 
Compounding this dire situation since 2000 
is that many RDCs have been subjected to 
sustained, politically-motivated violence and 
intimidation. Hammar (2003) describes how 
there has been a ‘vast array of attacks’ either 
by ‘war veterans’ or by Zanu-PF ‘youth militia’ 
– often with the complicity or participation of 
senior politicians and bureaucratic arms of the 
state – on RDCs and their associated institutions. 
This has served to radically alter the landscape 
of governance in Zimbabwe. These attacks are 
essentially attempts on behalf of Zanu-PF to 
‘recapture the frontiers of rule’ that the space 
of local government represents. This violence, 
coupled with the overall impacts of ‘political 
disorder’, has served to make the current 
position of RDCs precarious, creating confusion 
with regard to authority at district levels. Thus 
decentralisation – the ‘context’ within which 
CAMPFIRE is set – is a highly politicised and 
complicated arena. Understanding this arena is 
essential to understanding the political and policy 
pressures facing CAMPFIRE. 
Implementation approach and 
challenges
The process of policy development in CAMPFIRE 
has been a gradual one, spanning many years, 
involving thousands of people from local level 
to the international arena, and drawing upon 
concepts from a range of different disciplines. 
This process has proven essential in shaping the 
robust programme that CAMPFIRE remains 
today. The process ensured the development of 
a strong policy network which proved influential 
in determining the outcome of policy decisions, 
both nationally and internationally, and flexible 
enough to adapt to the changing political context. 
Duffy (2000:1) describes how the effect of this 
process ‘depoliticised internal environmental 
politics’ by ensuring that all stakeholders brought 
into and supported CAMPFIRE and the economic 
and conservation goals that it represented. 
There is consensus among observers that one 
of the distinguishing features contributing to what 
has proven to be the robustness of CAMPFIRE is 
that of its local origins. Its conceptual origins date 
back to the early 1960s when influential studies 
on game meat production were conducted in the 
south-east lowveld. This led to development of the 
hypothesis that, in certain ecological conditions, 
wildlife ranching could economically outperform 
cattle ranching. Policy makers concluded from 
this that the future of wildlife could only be 
ensured in a policy context where wildlife could 
be made an economically competitive form 
of land use (Child 1995). The outcome was a 
radical shift in conservation paradigms – away 
from protectionism to sustainable use. The 
following years saw a remarkable expansion 
of wildlife on commercial farms (Child 2004), 
which established an important precedent and 
influenced future policy development. 
As an interim measure, Project WINDFALL 
was initiated in 1978 (Derman 1997). Whilst 
WINDFALL was largely unsuccessful in 
meeting its goals, it represented a critical step 
in the development of the conceptual basis 
of CAMPFIRE because of the instructive 
lessons that came out of it. These included that 
conservation is as much a socio-economic as an 
ecological issue, and that successful rural resource 
management approaches must be designed and 
implemented with local participation (Moore 
1997). DNPWLM policy makers sought advice 
from economists and social scientists, as they 
recognised the need to integrate institutional and 
economic issues with ecological concerns. This 
initial dialogue eventually led to the formation of 
the CCG, which in these early years served as an 
informal ‘incubator’, generating the conceptual 
underpinnings of CBNRM and providing the 
means through which a diverse network of actors 
and policy entrepreneurs was established. 
Encompassing leading social scientists from 
the Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS), 
rural development experts from Zimbabwe 
Trust, ecologists from the World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF) and economists from the Ministry of 
Finance, this group had comprehensive regional 
and global networks and knowledge which 
they were able to draw upon to incorporate 
experiences and concepts from around the 
world. Consequently, the underlying conceptual 
basis of CAMPFIRE, whilst being informed 
by global experience, was critically grounded 
in the realities and experiences of communal 
land resource management in Zimbabwe. This 
group developed the second conceptual root of 
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CAMPFIRE, the identification of communal 
property regimes with strong tenurial rights as 
the appropriate management unit in communal 
land contexts (Murphree 1997). This was to 
lead to the elaboration by Murphree (1991) of 
the five ‘principles’ for policy. These principles 
have since informed policy development and 
guided implementation of CBNRM initiatives 
throughout the region (Steiner & Rihoy 1995; 
SASUSG 1995; Jones 2004). This gradual, 
locally-led process of trial and error – which led 
to the development of a strong an effective policy 
network able to influence the policy process from 
the start and adapt to the changing context – is 
in stark contrast to the introduction of CBNRM 
in Botswana. 
Institutional landscape
A further feature which contrasts strongly with 
Botswana is that of the institutional landscape. 
The local roots of CAMPIRE and the long 
process of conceptual development ensured 
that there was a great diversity of institutions 
involved in implementation of the programme 
from the outset. The last seven to eight years 
have witnessed a marked shift in the nature of 
the institutions playing such roles, a change 
brought about largely, if inadvertently, by donors. 
This shift has witnessed the transformation of 
CAMPFIRE from a programme led by technical 
agencies of government but supported by a strong 
group of civil society organisations – manifested 
as the CCG – to one in which civil society 
organisations and even the technical government 
agencies have largely been sidelined. Over 
the last five years the programme has become 
dominated by the CAMPFIRE Association (CA) 
and through it, the RDCs. Whilst this shift has 
had some negative impacts, such as a loss of 
implementation expertise, innovation and capacity 
(Child et al. 2003), given the accompanying shifts 
in the political, economic and social climate of 
Zimbabwe, and the implications that this has 
had for policy-making processes, it has been 
a significant factor in ensuring the survival of 
CAMPFIRE during this volatile period. The 
sense of ownership by RDCs through the CA 
and the income that it generates for RDCs have 
ensured their continued involvement and political 
support of CAMPFIRE.
From the beginning, CAMPFIRE – through 
the CCG – brought together a coalition of agencies 
that had different but complementary objectives 
and areas of expertise. Based on recognition of 
the need for an institution that would represent the 
interests of the producer communities, the CCG 
then created the CA. In 1991, the CCG passed the 
leadership of the programme to the CA, with the 
intention of building its capacity as the legitimate 
representative of its rural constituency.45 A 
distinctive feature of most implementing 
organisations was that they were dominated 
by highly committed and technically expert 
individuals, who, whilst having comprehensive 
networks and contacts which cross-cut sectoral, 
scale, racial and ethnic boundaries, were 
nevertheless predominantly white and from 
NGOs. A further distinctive feature of this 
actor-network is the degree to which certain key 
individuals played crucial roles. Acting as ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’, individuals such as Murphree, 
Martin, Nduku and Maveneke played pivotal 
and critical roles in creating and driving policy 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, a period when 
the positive relationship between government 
and civil society created space for civil society 
influence on policy making.
As of 1989, CAMPFIRE began to attract 
financial support from donors, most notably from 
USAID through the NRMP. From 1995, USAID 
targeted the bulk of funding directly at the CA, 
which proceeded to marginalise other members 
of the CCG (Child et al. 2003). Following the 
withdrawal of funding for CAMPFIRE from 
USAID and most other donors, in 2003, the CCG 
disbanded as a functional group.46 
The CCG and the institutions of which it 
was comprised, which originally played such a 
catalytic and central role, have become largely 
irrelevant within the context of CAMPFIRE as of 
2005. But given the shifting political dynamics, 
priorities and affiliations within the country, 
the CCG by its very nature may have become 
a political liability. As the above discussion 
has indicated, the racially biased and party-
oriented political and policy environment no 
longer favours, or even tolerates, interventions 
from whites or NGOs, and discourages rational, 
technical, science-based policy solutions such 
as those advanced by the CCG. The replacement 
of the CCG by the CA alone as the primary 
advocacy group for CAMPFIRE represents the 
replacement of what has become a politically 
impotent group by one that has a significant 
political voice with significant incentives to 
use it. Reinforcing the political voice of the 
CA are the many individuals who are, or were, 
at the forefront of the CA. These individuals 
are influential political figures themselves, 
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often with strong links to the ruling party. For 
example, the now deceased Border Gezi made his 
political reputation with CAMPFIRE, going on 
to become the minister of the powerful Ministry 
of Youth, Gender and Employment Creation. 
Several other leading CA board members have 
used CAMPFIRE as a stepping stone in their 
political careers and remain associated with it, 
including former MPs Chauke and Chafesuka 
and sitting MP Mackenzie. Others, such as the 
former chairperson of the CA Board, Gotura, 
have moved on to other significant political 
roles, in this case as chairperson of the influential 
Association of RDCs. 
Factors affecting CBNRM 
Whilst the discourse upon which CAMPFIRE and 
sustainable use were based had solid scientific 
and rational underpinnings and appealed to the 
technical policy-making process of the 1990s, 
there were also other important elements to the 
CAMPFIRE discourse that appealed to a range 
of other agendas. These elements included 
empowerment, participation, racial equity, 
promotion of African traditional practices and 
national sovereignty, all of which government 
and CAMPFIRE advocates were able to use to 
good effect to bolster their image and political 
popularity. 
Whilst sustainable use may have been 
an accepted approach nationally, it was still 
controversial internationally. CAMPFIRE 
played an important strategic role in regional and 
international debates about sustainable use, most 
notably in those related to CITES (Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species 
of Wild Fauna and Flora) and the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, putting Zimbabwe 
at the forefront of conservation initiatives 
globally. During the 1990s, it achieved what 
Wolmer et al. (2003:5) refer to as ‘iconic 
status…rapidly becoming the most famous 
exemplar of CBNRM’. It was the recipient of 
many international conservation awards and 
accolades. Media attention, both nationally and 
internationally, was devoted to it; it attracted 
generous donor support to the country; researchers 
from all over the world converged on Zimbabwe; 
and thousands of workshops, conferences and 
publications were generated. The critical acclaim 
and recognition generated by it for Zimbabwe 
cemented its popularity at home both politically 
and socially.
The international profile that CAMPFIRE 
achieved also made it possible for the government 
to play to other populist political agendas, 
enabling it to adopt populist stances at high-
profile international events that resonated with 
the electorate at home. For example, arguments 
concerning sovereignty over national resources, 
‘African solutions to African problems’, and anti- 
eco-imperialism (the new form of colonialism) 
were all commonly put forward as arguments 
in support of sustainable use and CAMPFIRE 
at international meetings by the government 
and CCG. All of this received significant media 
attention, in which CAMPFIRE was seen as 
a vehicle through which the government was 
upholding the sovereign rights of Zimbabweans 
internationally. Thus CAMPFIRE met a wide 
range of political agendas throughout the 1990s; 
one of the fundamental keys to its success in this 
regard was the comprehensive and cross-sectoral 
actor-network it was able to mobilise. 
Strategic compromises on devolution 
Murphree (1997:11) notes that ‘a strategic 
compromise between concept and policy’ 
characterised the process of policy development 
for CAMPFIRE. These compromises have 
led to what are generally perceived to be the 
major weaknesses of CAMPFIRE, but they 
also created a level of political acceptance that 
allowed it to emerge in the first place and to 
survive the political upheavals of the last five 
years. Murphree (2001) describes the three main 
accommodations as firstly, the rejection of de jure 
devolution of wildlife management and revenue 
rights to de facto rights; secondly, the rejection 
of self-defined local institutions in favour of 
existing sub-structures of the RDC, WADCOs 
and VIDCOs; and thirdly, the introduction of 
tactics based on conditionality to ensure revenue 
distribution to sub-district levels through the 
CAMPFIRE guidelines. 
Centre to local level 
This pragmatic approach ensured that the legal 
status and rights of self-definition of communities 
were compromised from the first. Distribution of 
revenues depended on the RDCs’ adherence to 
CAMPFIRE policy guidelines, which stated that 
RDCs were expected to distribute a percentage of 
income (as of 2002 this was increased from 50% 
to 55%) derived from wildlife use to producer 
communities47 and to allow these communities 
to be responsible for a number of wildlife 
management activities. Because of the existing 
28
Devolution and democratisation of natural resource management in southern Africa: 
A comparative analysis of CBNRM policy processes in Botswana and Zimbabwe
administrative system of local government, 
producer communities had to be represented 
by WADCOs and VIDCOs, which had no legal 
personality but were advisory bodies to RDCs. 
In practice then, AA decentralises authority and 
control over wildlife to RDCs, and CAMPFIRE 
confers on communities the right to share in the 
benefits from the use of wildlife by others but 
not to use it themselves. Despite the various 
mechanisms that have been developed to enable 
greater community control, such as community 
trusts, such mechanisms remain dependent upon 
the willingness of RDCs to comply. 
As already discussed, RDCs are facing 
increasing pressure to retain financial benefits for 
general district development purposes.48 There 
is consensus that poor fiscal devolution leads 
to a diminishing interest in the programme by 
communities co-existing with wildlife (Zimbabwe 
Trust 2001; Child et al 2003; Bond 2001). If this 
process remains unchecked, then the future of 
CAMPFIRE is uncertain. Attempts over the years 
by technical advisors and bureaucrats, from the 
government and from NGOs, to persuade RDCs 
to devolve greater revenues have proven largely 
futile in the face of the fiscal pressures placed 
upon RDCs. The following sections explore 
whether there is evidence that locally emerging 
political and social pressures can prove more 
successful in encouraging further devolution of 
fiscal responsibilities and the implications if this 
is the case. 
Community control and benefits 
Given that rights and responsibilities are legally 
vested with RDCs, the level to which individual 
communities are able to control and benefit from 
CAMPFIRE becomes an arbitrary process that 
rests largely on the inclinations of individual 
RDCs. As in the case of Botswana, CBNRM 
activities in Zimbabwe generate substantial 
benefits, even though the extent to which these 
benefits actually reach broader community 
members and improve individual household 
incomes remains questionable (Child et al. 2003; 
Bond 2001; Campfire Association 2005). The 
question that is relevant to pursue for Zimbabwe, 
as it is for Botswana, is whether the nature and 
extent of these benefits are enough to generate 
appreciation of CBNRM by rural constituents 
and stimulate demands from them for greater 
devolution. Further, if such demand does appear 
to be forthcoming, is there evidence that RDCs 
are responding to it? The general conclusion in 
the case of Botswana was negative; the situation 
in Zimbabwe, as illustrated by the two case 
studies presented here, appears more complex. 
Throughout Zimbabwe, there are hundreds 
of CAMPFIRE-related institutions at a sub-
district level. Out of a total of 57 RDCs, 52 are 
involved. This makes it extremely difficult to 
make generalisations about the programme based 
on events in only two villages. Nevertheless, we 
do attempt to do so, whilst also recognising that, 
for different reasons, our two field sites, Mahenye 
and Chizvirizvi, are ‘special cases’ within the 
country. It is also essential to bear in mind that 
CAMPFIRE has been operational for some 15 
years. Throughout this period, incidences of 
elite capture of benefits at a local level have 
been extremely common. Evidence from the case 
studies presented below implies that the primary 
reason for this occurring now is the chaotic and 
destabilising influence of the national context. 
Mahenye case study
Mahenye Ward in the south-eastern periphery of 
Zimbabwe covers only 210 square kilometres and 
has a population of less than 1 000 households. 
However, its impact and reach over the past 
two decades in the history, discourse and 
practice of CBNRM nationally, regionally and 
internationally belie its size and remoteness. 
Throughout the 1990s it was one of the prime 
exemplars of CAMPFIRE as a successful 
sustainable development model, was well known 
for its demonstration of innovative growth and 
adaptation and was a major recipient of capacity-
building efforts. Murphree (2001) provided a 
detailed history of the ‘success’ of Mahenye, 
illustrating its entrepreneurial flair in diversifying 
from sport-hunting into ecotourism and its 
resilience in the face of legal and bureaucratic 
constraints. He went on persuasively to argue the 
need for further devolution of authority to ward 
level. Because of the high profile and influence of 
Mahenye, what happens here ‘matters’ not just to 
the people and stakeholders of Mahenye, but to 
the process of policy development in general. 
The key factors Murphree (2001) identified 
as contributing to this ‘success story’ were the 
insights, ingenuity and commitment of socially 
dedicated individuals in positions of influence 
or leadership, balancing sources of traditional 
and popular legitimacy, an ‘enlightened private 
sector’, a rich resource base, capacity for 
flexibility and acceptance of innovation and risk, 
and intra-communal cohesiveness. He comments 
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that:
in-group solidarity rooted in history and 
reinforced by perceptions of external 
differences….Like any community 
Mahenye has its internal differentiations 
but these have been contained by a sense 
of collective communal interest. The 
importance of this cannot be overstressed... 
(Murphree 2001:192).
Whilst individuals played a key role, Murphree 
(2001) also demonstrates that economic 
incentives were a key motivator in ensuring 
positive outcomes. Natural resource management 
activities, primarily safari hunting and ecotourism, 
brought with them improved infrastructure, but, 
most significantly, they contributed to household 
incomes through the regular annual distribution 
of household dividends in an equitable and 
transparent manner. Whilst the amount distributed 
varied from year to year, depending on the size of 
budget and number of households, and increased 
considerably after the introduction of high-end 
tourism lodges in 1997, allocations remained 
consistently at about 50% of the total budget for 
the period 1992 to 1997 (Murphree 2001).
Our research indicates that the situation in 
Mahenye has altered dramatically over the last 
five years. Of the 36 people interviewed, all but 
2 – the current Mahenye CAMPFIRE Committee 
(MCC) chairperson and the chief – noted that 
until approximately 2000 CAMPFIRE was a 
representative process; that ward residents had 
considerable information on their rights and 
technical information (for example, the value 
of individual species and the income from 
revenue-generating ventures in their area); and 
that residents were able to participate through 
collectively designed and commonly understood 
democratic procedures. They further indicated 
that, since 2000, ward inhabitants had ceased to 
benefit from or participate in any decision-making 
processes related to CAMPFIRE, concurring that 
the only beneficiaries were now the chief and his 
immediate family. How could such a dramatic 
change occur in such a short period of time? 
The MCC was established in the late 1980s. 
In order to ensure effective management of 
the resource base and an accountable and 
representative local-level management structure, 
it was established at the ward level. Whilst it 
has no legal basis, the MCC is, according to 
its constitution, responsible for carrying out 
management functions and employing local staff 
to monitor wildlife, poaching and the hunting 
activities of professional hunters. It sets budgets 
and reports to general community meetings on 
its activities and planning. Prior to 2000, MCC 
board members were democratically elected 
at open annual general meetings (AGMs), and 
all decisions regarding use of revenues were 
collectively taken at these AGMs. 
The demise of CAMPFIRE coincides with 
four related local events: firstly, the death of the 
highly respected old Chief Mahenye in 2001; 
secondly, on the instructions of the new chief, 
the complete change in MCC office-bearers as a 
result of the MCC elections of 2001, including 
the election of the chief’s younger brother as 
chairperson (as of 2005, every office-bearer 
was a relation of the chief); thirdly, the election 
of a new ward councillor; and fourthly, the 
re-tendering of the hunting concession, which 
has led to ongoing conflict and the widespread 
belief among all stakeholders that the three 
different safari operators currently bidding for 
the concession are competing among each other 
in their attempts to illicitly ‘buy off’ the chief and 
the MCC in order to get preferential treatment. 
These changes have resulted in the removal of the 
strong local leadership which Murphree (2001) 
identified as a distinctive feature of Mahenye. 
Local power and authority have shifted away 
from the delicate balance established between 
traditional and popular structures, exclusively 
into the hands of the traditional leadership. 
Events at a national level compounded 
those at the local level. The year 2000 saw 
a dramatic and public shift in the political 
dynamics in Zimbabwe, culminating in an 
increase in politically motivated violence and 
in the collapse of the ‘rule of law’ (Raftopoulos 
2004). Underlying this situation was a racially 
and politically biased populist discourse about 
the return of ‘African soil to Africans’ adopted 
by the ruling party. This served to marginalise 
and vilify whites and, by inference, political 
opponents to the ruling party. At local levels this 
often translated into the violent persecution and 
marginalisation of opposition supporters and a 
suspicion of wildlife management as a means by 
which whites were attempting to retain control 
of land (Wolmer et al. 2003). Rihoy et al. (2007) 
provide evidence that covert intimidation by 
party and traditional leadership structures has 
been commonplace in Mahenye, the impact of 
which has been the marginalisation of key figures 
who formerly dominated the MCC (and who 
were known to be opposition supporters) from 
decision-making roles and a further reinforcement 
of the powers of the chief, an openly avowed 
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ZANU-PF supporter, whose power and legal 
status have been enhanced still further by the 
TLA. Meanwhile, those former members of 
the CCG who had been active in providing 
capacity-building and conflict resolution inputs 
within Mahenye throughout the 1990s – who in 
former times would have functioned as neutral 
arbitrators in local power struggles – were no 
longer able to do so due to a lack of funds or 
the lack of a mandate to do so arising from their 
marginalisation from CAMPFIRE as result of the 
national political context as discussed above.
The effect on CAMPFIRE of this co-option 
by the local elite has been dramatic. For example, 
since 2000 only two AGMs have been held, both 
of which were poorly attended in comparison to 
former AGMs. Elections for committee members 
have not been held at an AGM since 2001. 
When AGMs are held, their function is now 
very different. According to the chairperson of 
the MCC: 
We use AGMs as a way to tell our community 
how the committee and traditional leaders 
have budgeted and spent CAMPFIRE 
money and other decisions. It’s where we 
let them know what their leaders are doing 
for them (C. Chauke, pers. comm.).
There have also been significant shifts in 
economic incentives, which are only partly 
explained by the weakening of the economy. The 
high inflation rates and the collapse of the tourist 
industry have reduced the amount of revenues 
generated by the lodges, whilst income from the 
safari operations has stayed roughly comparable 
in real terms to that generated prior to 2000. 
However, since 2000, there has only been one 
payment of household dividends, in 2004, when 
a total of Z$6 100 was distributed per household. 
Of this, each household immediately had to return 
Z$6 000 to fund a ‘district development levy’, the 
purpose of which has never been clarified. This 
resulted in a take-home of just Z$100, an amount 
which, as one interviewee put it, ‘was not enough 
to buy one match’. 
Meanwhile, those who attend the monthly 
MCC meetings get a sitting allowance of 
$15 000 per session, refreshments and transport, 
theoretically amounting to a cost exceeding 
$13 200 000 per meeting. This is in stark 
contrast with the total dividend payout in 2004 
of $6 100 000 from a total income that exceeded 
$113 000 000. In summary, in the last five years, 
only one household dividend payment has been 
made. This amounted to 5% of the income 
for 2004, compared with an average dividend 
payment of around 50% annually throughout 
the 1990s.
The widely-held belief in Mahenye of 
corruption, misuse and abuse of funds and power 
by the MCC and the chief resulted in an internal 
audit of the MCC by the RDC in April 2004, 
which confirmed such abuse.
Despite these problems, the people of Mahenye 
continue to demonstrate the remarkable level 
of intra-communal cohesiveness identified by 
Murphree (2001), agreeing that the root cause of 
problems lies with the co-option by the traditional 
leadership. Despite large-scale disillusionment 
with the current situation, positive participation 
in CAMPFIRE for over ten years prior to these 
events has ensured that people are aware of their 
rights and the nature of the current problems and 
have a common strategy to solve these. 
People are collectively indicating that the 
RDC has a central role to play in fostering the 
conditions that will ensure empowerment by 
providing a neutral arbitration role in a situation 
that for cultural reasons cannot be addressed 
locally. Co-option and corruption of power at a 
local level can be directly linked to the broader 
political and economic crisis facing Zimbabwe 
today. However, CAMPFIRE, through the 
provision of benefits and information, has 
effectively empowered this community and 
provided its members with the confidence to 
express demands, including accountability, to 
the RDC. 
Chizvirizvi case study
Research of a similar nature in Chizvirizvi 
Resettlement Area in Chiredzi District indicates 
that the co-option of local CAMPFIRE benefits by 
local elites that Mahenye has experienced is not 
an isolated case. However, the parallels between 
the two cases do not go much further than this. 
Chizvirizvi represents an exceptional situation, it 
being the only case in which AA has been granted 
directly to a sub-district institution – formerly 
the Chizvirizvi Development Committee (CDC), 
now the Wildlife Development Committee 
(WDC). This situation has occurred due to 
Chizvirizvi’s status as a small-scale farming area, 
not as communal land (Mandondo & Kozanayi 
2003).
Mandondo and Kozanayi (2003) have 
documented the history of Chizvirizvi in relation 
to land settlement and tenure patterns, paying 
particular attention to the ‘waxing and waning’ 
of the influence of institutions and the impact 
that these have had on development. They detail 
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how key local individuals were able to mobilise 
collective local action through strong and 
effective local institutions and personal networks 
at a regional and national level, ensuring that 
community demands to affect a change from 
nucleated settlement patterns to individual plots 
were met through the collective and co-ordinated 
action of the traditional leadership and CDC. 
However, this process was fraught with conflict at 
various levels and the configuration of institutions 
that were able to deliver the demands of the 
community did not last long in the face of the 
shifting national political context. The emergence 
of war veterans as a significant political force 
in the years 2000 to 2002, and their role in 
spearheading the seizure of the commercial farms 
that surrounded Chizvirizvi, ensured that they 
soon came to the fore in local political processes. 
Mandondo and Kozanayi (2003:10) note that 
‘the coercive and often violent activities of 
these groups significantly eroded the power and 
influence of both the developmental resettlement 
committee and traditional leadership.’ It is 
against this background that wildlife management 
activities within Chizvirizvi take place. 
The event that inspired individuals within 
Chizvirizvi to secure their own quota was a 
‘look and learn’ visit by the councillor and 
others to Mahenye in 2002. AA was granted 
to CDC in 2003 following approaches by the 
councillor and the then chairperson of the 
CDC to relevant external authorities, despite 
opposition from the district administrator, RDC, 
CA and senior personnel within the WMA. The 
former chairperson of the CDC notes that the 
arguments they advanced were based on an 
appeal to the racially dominated land discourse 
that was pushing the fast-track resettlement 
process. Chizvirizvi was surrounded on three 
sides by white-owned commercial farming areas 
or conservancies, all of which had rights over 
their wildlife. Why should this then not apply 
to the black landowners of Chizvirizvi too? The 
unorthodox process they followed consisted 
of exclusive discussions between these two 
individuals and various political authorities, as 
opposed to the more ‘usual’ technical authorities, 
firstly at a provincial level and then at the national 
level. These culminated in discussions with the 
Minster of Local Government and the Minister 
of Environment and Tourism. Throughout this 
process the director of Lowveld Hunters provided 
logistical and financial support and advice to these 
individuals, upon the prior understanding that 
Lowveld Hunters would receive the concession 
when granted. The outcome was the issuing 
of a quota for the CDC in 2003, which was 
subsequently renewed in 2004, 2005 and 2006. 
Whilst negotiations were ongoing, the ward 
councillor unilaterally decided to dissolve the 
CDC, replacing it with a WDC and appointing 
himself as chairperson. No elections were 
held.49 
Once the quota was issued, the councillor 
called a community meeting in April 2003 
at which people were informed that AA had 
been secured and that Lowveld Hunters was 
appointed as the safari operator. Lowveld 
Hunters made various promises of infrastructural 
developments for Chizvirizvi, including radio 
links and electrification. As of mid-2005, none 
had been met and no contract existed between 
the operator and WDC. To date, this remains 
the only community meeting held to discuss 
wildlife management. None of the procedures or 
functions ‘normally’ associated with ward-level 
CAMPFIRE institutions have been undertaken, 
including the maintenance of financial records, 
although there is a bank account, and no 
constitution exists. 
As of end 2005, total benefits distributed were 
from the shooting of one lion, which resulted in 
the cash distribution of Z$5 000 000 to households 
bordering Gonarezhou in late 2004.50 There is a 
general belief that at least two elephants had been 
shot, but it is not clear whether these were shot 
on PAC (Problem Animal Control) or hunted, 
what the value of an elephant may be or where 
any funds arising may have gone. The councillor 
maintains that he unilaterally decided to invest 
the income from these elephants – which he 
claims to have been Z$60 000 000 – in a tractor 
for the resettlement area and that this had been 
done. However, the only tractor purchased at 
that time in the area had been one he purchased 
privately. As no financial records are kept, total 
income is impossible to determine, and as only 
the councillor and the former chairperson of the 
CDC have access to the quota in Chizvirizvi, 
they are the only individuals who have any 
knowledge of the real or potential value of the 
wildlife resource. 
Table 2 provides details of the quotas allocated 
by the WMA to Chizvirizvi from 2004 to 2006. 
As neither the WMA nor the RDC undertakes any 
monitoring of hunting activities and as no local 
records are kept, it is not possible to determine 
what the actual off-take was. What is clear, is that 
the potential value of this quota to Chizvirizvi 
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vastly exceeds the Z$65 000 000 which the 
councillor maintains has been raised.
Research in Chizvirizvi revealed that the 
majority of respondents are completely unaware 
of the wildlife management programme. Of those 
who were, all said they received no benefits, had 
no involvement in any management activities or 
any decisions regarding the use of benefits, had 
no knowledge of funds generated or how these 
funds had been used, and had no knowledge of 
any procedures that should be followed or of the 
value or nature of the resources being utilised. 
Those interviewed who did have knowledge of 
the programme were of the opinion that their 
most significant problem was lack of information 
relating to any aspect of it. Over 50% of those 
interviewed also indicated that fear of the 
councillor, who has a long and well-known track 
record of violence in the area, was preventing 
anyone from taking any action to address the 
situation. The majority of respondents indicated 
that the traditional leadership should take the 
lead in addressing the situation, whilst no one 
identified this as a role for the RDC. Whilst the 
chief and other traditional leaders interviewed 
were outspoken in their condemnation of the 
existing situation, they, too, indicated that without 
any information and given the powerful political 
patronage that the councillor enjoys, there was 
little they could do to address the situation. The 
solution to the problem identified by the majority 
of interviewees was to ensure that the councillor 
is not re-elected. Chiredzi RDC, whose members 
are well aware of the situation in Chizvirizvi, is 
unwilling to assist in addressing the problem, 
as it does not have the mandate provided by 
AA, because of the highly politicised nature of 
the situation and because of the long history of 
conflict and controversy between the RDC and 
Chizvirizvi. 
Whilst it is extremely difficult to make 
generalisations based on just these two examples 
of CAMPFIRE, it is clear that, given the chaotic 
national context within which CAMPFIRE is now 
operating, the RDCs have an important potential 
role to play as intermediary institutions that can 
ensure that relatively inexperienced and unskilled 
local community institutions are not at the mercy 
of corrupt external and local forces, for example, 
unscrupulous private operators or overtly self-
serving political or traditional interests. 
Conclusion
Since its inception, CAMPFIRE has been 
implemented by a variety of different 
organisations with different areas of expertise 
and implementation capacities. This has ensured 
an appropriate blend of skills and approaches 
and significant human and financial resources 
have been brought to bear. Whilst this does not 
imply that implementation has been faultless or 
that efforts to establish representative institutions 
have always been successful, it did ensure that 
prior to 2000 basic oversights in implementation 
did not undermine community efforts to establish 
representative local governance structures. This 
is best appreciated when contrasted with the 
situation in Botswana, where efforts to establish 
local governance institutions were tied to the 




Buffalo 70 1 1 2
Bush pig 50 1 1
Elephant 120 1 1 2
Hyaena 45 1 1
Kudu 40 1 1
Leopard 30 1 1 1
Porcupine 35 1 1
Steenbok 65 1 1
Warthog 70 1 1
Sources: WMA (Wildlife Management Authority) 2004; WMA (Wildlife Management Authority) 
2005; WMA (Wildlife Management Authority) 2006. 
Table 2: WMA-issued hunting quotas for Chizvirizvi resettlement area, 2004–06
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implementing agencies, resulting in the creation 
of unaccountable institutions. 
A further significant contrast with Botswana 
is the central role that RDCs have fulfilled in 
implementing CAMPFIRE at the local level. 
Each RDC has its own CAMPFIRE management 
unit which – originally in collaboration with 
supporting NGOs and DWNPLM, but since 
the mid-1990s increasingly independently 
– is primarily responsible for CAMPFIRE 
management activities locally, including the 
provision of institutional strengthening and 
capacity-building services. This has ensured that 
within the technical advisory arms of most RDCs 
there is real knowledge of and commitment to 
the central importance of further devolution of 
responsibilities and authority in order to achieve 
the goals of resource management and community 
development. This knowledge and commitment 
could prove vital to further decision making 
by RDCs on devolution. However, as we have 
maintained throughout this paper, having the 
technical knowledge to achieve the objectives of 
CBNRM will not alone ensure positive outcomes. 
Decisions will be influenced by economic and 
political pressures from national and local 
levels. The example of Mahenye appears to give 
credence to the notion that RDCs can and will 
respond to the needs of their local constituents 
should these be clearly articulated. 
Any discussion on CAMPFIRE has to 
be rooted in the current political, social and 
economic context and should take cognisance of 
the historical context and its implications. At the 
macro level, the political climate is not conducive 
to devolutionary approaches that place more 
power in the hands of local communities. Since 
the early 1990s, the tendency of government 
has been to centralise authority and control. For 
example, proposals to provide local communities 
with proprietorship over land and natural 
resources by the Rukuni Land Commission 
Report (Government of Zimbabwe 1994) were 
either ignored or severely watered down. Since 
2000, this tendency has been enhanced, with 
authoritarianism becoming normal political 
practice in what is now a deeply polarised state 
(Raftopoulos 2004). At the district level, RDCs 
have been assigned authority over a variety of 
resources that they have been reluctant to pass 
on to sub-district levels, and which they are 
equally as reluctant to return to the national level. 
This situation is compounded by the economic 
crisis that has resulted in CAMPFIRE revenues 
becoming increasingly significant to the budgets 
of RDCs.
But despite this context of crisis, CAMPFIRE 
has shown remarkable resilience. Our research 
indicates that this resilience is primarily a 
function of the decentralisation strategies 
that characterised CAMPFIRE, as opposed to 
devolution. Given the very specific situation now 
facing Zimbabwe, decentralisation, by ensuring 
that the relatively politically powerful RDCs are 
outspoken supporters of CAMPFIRE, has led to a 
situation whereby the government’s recentralising 
tendencies have been unable to come into force. 
Moreover, based on field evidence from two sites, 
Mahenye and Chizvirizvi, we maintain that the 
RDCs are playing (in the case of Mahenye) or 
could play (Chizvirizvi), a vital role in ensuring 
that local elites do not monopolise and capture 
the process at a local level. RDCs are providing 
a system of checks and balances to ensure that 
the process is not abused by powerful local elites 
working in collaboration with unscrupulous 
private sector interests and national politicians. 
We regard, under certain circumstances, one of 
the most significant impacts of CAMPFIRE over 
the last 15 years to have been the empowerment 
of local communities – by making them aware of 
the value of the natural resources in their areas 
and their (albeit limited) rights to these, and 
by raising awareness of mechanisms through 
which they can exercise these rights. Mahenye 
illustrates that community members now have 
the knowledge, confidence and means through 
which they are able to clearly and collectively 
express ‘demands’ to the RDCs and that RDCs 
will respond to these. 
Having created this situation, CAMPFIRE 
could ultimately lead to greater accountability 
of the RDCs to their local constituents, thus 
contributing to processes of democratisation. 
To date, the evidence that it may do so is 
too limited to determine outcomes. The key 
factor is the nature of the relationship and 
distribution of rights between RDCs and local 
institutions. Negotiating these is a vital step in 
processes of empowerment and democratisation. 
Understanding power–knowledge relations is 
important for local communities in their quest for 
empowerment. Once local communities recognise 
their collective power and political muscle, they 
are able to assert themselves at the local level. 
Assertiveness at the local level is a prerequisite 
for stimulating negotiation and political dialogue 
in CBNRM, even in a seemingly hostile political 
climate. Mahenye provides evidence that local 
Table 2: WMA-issued hunting quotas for Chizvirizvi resettlement area, 2004–06
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communities can stimulate negotiation when they 
assert and articulate their interests and recognise 
their collective power through non-compliance 
and ‘playing their political cards’ shrewdly. 
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7. Lessons learned
Looking at the contemporary problems faced 
by CBNRM, some observers (Murphree 2004; 
CASS/PLAAS 2004) argue that the way forward 
lies with communities ‘demanding’ further rights 
from government. This call for ‘demand-driven 
CBNRM’ takes into account only half of the 
equation. Equally important is that the state has 
the capacity and willingness to provide access, 
justice and legal redress based on a respect for 
human rights (Jones & Gaventa 2002). Thus, 
in non-democratic polities, such as Zimbabwe 
and increasingly Botswana, demand on its own 
is insufficient; it must be accompanied by the 
creation of political and policy spaces to enable 
local communities to participate in CBNRM 
decision making and politics. 
CBNRM is a political process, involving 
political risks. Implementers and policy advocates 
need to understand the power relations associated 
with CBNRM and the political landscape in 
their quest for better governance and socio-
economic and political empowerment. Evidence 
from both Botswana and Zimbabwe bears out 
that national political and economic contexts 
are defining factors in determining outcomes. 
The two cases provide interesting insights 
into the governance and politics of natural 
resource management. It is clear that alliances 
and boundaries form and that, when situations 
change, these alliances and boundaries shift and 
reconfigure the landscape of natural resource 
management governance and politics. In the 
case of Zimbabwe, a strong actor-network with 
an ability to mobilise political support has 
played a central role in the development of an 
appropriate policy environment, although this 
has involved pragmatic compromises along the 
way. In the case of Botswana, the weakness of the 
actor-network and the resultant lack of political 
influence have exposed CBNRM to the arbitrary 
whims of individuals among the political and 
economic elite, culminating in the current threat 
of recentralisation. What is evident in both cases 
is that the role of local government in actor-
networks can be crucial in sustaining CBNRM 
in the face of recentralisation threats which serve 
the interests of some elites. While in Zimbabwe 
RDCs are notoriously associated with ‘capturing’ 
CAMPFIRE benefits, we argue that, in the current 
context of Zimbabwe, RDCs play a critical role 
in maintaining political support for CAMPFIRE 
at the national level and provide essential checks 
and balances at the local level which can prevent 
capture of the process by local elites. In contrast, 
the absence of involvement of RDCs in Botswana 
has led to a lack of implementation capacity, an 
absence of local checks and balances to prevent 
local elite capture, and a lack of political allies to 
ensure that recentralisation does not occur. 
Our findings confirm that a greater degree of 
decentralisation and devolution of authority over 
resources to local institutions does not necessarily 
ensure greater community development and 
CBNRM benefits. As Ribot (2004) and Murphree 
(2000) point out, it is the degree to which 
local-level institutions are representative and 
accountable to their communities that will 
determine their impact on development and 
conservation. It is on this basis that local 
government and CBNRM need to be better 
integrated, with a focus on local governance 
and democracy. Bypassing local government 
authorities runs many risks. There is a need 
for alliances and integration. The role of local 
government can be understood in terms of 
two perspectives of local councils: firstly, they 
can be viewed as controlling arms of state 
in rural communities and secondly, they can 
be seen as representative institutions looking 
after local interests (Duffy 2000; Hill 1994). 
The reality of the matter is that most local 
governments are substantially accountable 
to central government, even though their 
constituencies democratically elect councillors. 
It is this structuring of accountability and 
representation that concerns us as advocates of 
democratic CBNRM. We believe that CBNRM 
can contribute to democratisation as long as it 
ensures greater downward accountability and 
representation of RDCs to local constituents. 
This paper highlights the important role 
played by local government institutions, such as 
RDCs, in promoting decentralisation of resource 
management in Zimbabwe. RDCs are the legal 
appropriate structures for decentralising resource 
management and, when accountable downwards, 
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can create democratic space for policy making 
and political participation of rural communities. 
Contrary to the common belief that the RDC 
is where effective decentralisation ends, we 
consider that downwardly accountable RDCs 
offer counterbalancing forces to recentralisation 
and elite capture of CBNRM. The RDC is the 
legal personality with AA status in Zimbabwe. 
Thus, when exposed to democratic processes, 
local communities (the electorate and political 
constituency) can exert demands and pressure 
on RDCs to be downwardly accountable 
and representative. Therefore, the perceived 
unresponsiveness of RDCs to local-level 
demands and needs of local people reflects the 
political weaknesses of civil society and the lack 
of a politically aggressive (politically-salient) 
constituency that can challenge poor local 
government–local community relations. Given 
political and legal realities, the CAMPFIRE 
model of decentralised resource management 
and governance, which assigns RDCs AA 
status, is contextually relevant for Zimbabwe 
and can be improved by promoting local 
governance and democratisation of RDC decision 
making. Strengthening local decision making on 
CAMPFIRE issues requires sharing of power and 
decision making between RDCs and wildlife-
producer communities. When approached from 
this standpoint, it is possible to create synergies 
between the CBNRM objective of devolving 
managerial authority and decision making to 
producer communities and the legal requirements 
that assign appropriate authority over resource 
management to the RDCs. 
It is essential that CBNRM programmes 
be linked to issues of local governance and 
democracy and that local government institutions 
offer opportunities for mobilising local 
communities to participate in governance and 
development. The emphasis on devolution that 
has dominated the CBNRM debate has clouded 
the issue of governance and the potential positive 
aspects between first- and second-level tiers of 
governance, that is, the relationship between 
producer wards and RDCs (in Zimbabwe) 
and CBOs and land boards/local councils (in 
Botswana). Rather, focus should be directed 
at understanding and developing viable local 
governance regimes that enable rural constituents 
to demand accountability from local government 
structures.
In a nutshell, this paper revisits the nature 
of devolution and democratisation of natural 
resource management in southern Africa 
through a comparative analysis of CBNRM 
policy processes in Botswana and Zimbabwe. It 
calls into question the rhetoric of democracy in 
Botswana by exposing how political economic 
elites directing CBNRM policy processes have 
constrained political and policy space for local 
communities, thus limiting the participation 
of rural communities in shaping policy. Case 
evidence in Zimbabwe has shown how, in the 
context of the current political chaos in the 
country, local elites have captured CBNRM 
processes. The net result in both countries is 
that local communities suffer as elites prosper 
through their monopoly of decision-making 
authority over CBNRM benefits. On the basis 
of this concern, how do we build and sustain 
democratic CBNRM processes in undemocratic 
political systems? What needs to be done to build 
capacity for democracy and governance at the 
local level? As this study demonstrates, there 
is a need to articulate the political intentions of 
CBNRM and its democratising objectives. The 
political goal of transforming the state of power 
relations in CBNRM should be matched by real 
devolution of authority over natural resources to 
local communities. This will require meaningful 
participation of rural people in policy formulation 
and implementation. This can only be achieved 
if second-tier levels of local governance become 
accountable to their constituents as well as the state, 
that is, downwardly and upwardly accountable. 
If implemented appropriately, CBNRM has the 
potential to contribute towards the creation of 
downwardly as well as upwardly accountable 
institutions, thereby enhancing democratic space 
for marginalised rural communities. 
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8. Endnotes
1  The authors wish to acknowledge with thanks 
the assistance of The World Conservation 
Union (IUCN) in facilitating our research. 
However, the analysis and conclusions 
presented here are those of the authors and do 
not necessarily reflect the views of IUCN.
2  The distinction between devolution and 
decentralisation is central to this paper. 
Following Murphree (2000), we define 
devolution as ‘the creation of relatively 
autonomous realms of authority, responsibility 
and entitlement, with a primary accountability 
to their own constituencies’ (emphasis 
added) (Murphree 2000:6). In contrast, 
decentralisation is ‘the delegation of authority 
and responsibility to subordinate and dispersed 
units of hierarchical jurisdiction, which retain 
a primary accountability upward to their 
superiors in the hierarchy’ (emphasis added) 
(Murphree 2000:6). We draw upon this same 
distinction when referring to local government 
(state-related) as opposed to local-level 
governance institutions (communal, non-
state government). Murombedzi argues that 
devolution is a variant of decentralisation. For 
it to occur, it starts with central government’s 
willingness to share power and decision-
making authority with local-level institutions 
and NGOs. Consequently, there is an element 
of decentralisation in devolution, despite 
definitional and conceptual differences in the 
two terminologies (J. Murombedzi, CASS/
PLAAS CBNRM discussion forum, 2005).
3  A detailed description of the methodology is 
available upon request as this forms part of 
the lead author’s doctoral dissertation.
4  The influence of powerful political individuals, 
most notably the vice-president, Ian Khama, 
in CBNRM reflects the dominance of the 
traditional/modernised political economic 
elites in wildlife conservation. This reinforces 
Gibson’s (1999) assertion that wildlife in 
Africa is a political tool.
5  Approximately 45% of land is cattle pasture, 
17% national parks and game reserves, and 
22% wildlife management areas (WMAs). 
WMAs are meant to benefit communities that 
live on or near them, and wildlife utilisation is 
the primary form of land use. Other forms of 
development and agricultural or pastoral land 
uses are restricted. There are approximately 
163 controlled hunting areas (CHAs) that 
overlie other forms of land use in Botswana. 
The Government of Botswana has zoned 42 
CHAs for community management, of which 
14 leases have so far been issued (Rozemeijer 
2003:28). 
6  In 1994, Botswana celebrated its sixth open, 
democratic election, a record unmatched 
in Africa (Danevad 1993). To date, eight 
democratic elections have taken place.
7  Botswana has graduated from one of the 
poorest countries in the world at independence 
in 1966 to being classified by the World Bank 
as a middle-income country with a per capita 
GDP of US$9 200 in 2004 (UNDP 2005). 
8  This is usually as members of the boards 
of directors of the larger international tour 
companies, such as the Okavango Wilderness 
Safaris, the Botswana affiliate of Wilderness 
Safaris, the largest tourism operator in 
Africa.
9  They identify the shortcomings of the state of 
democracy in Botswana as the centralisation 
of constitutional and political power in the 
unelected office of the President; the lack of 
free speech and curtailment of the freedom of 
the media; the pervasiveness of secrecy and 
non-accountability in government decision 
making; and the inability of government to 
accept or engage with criticism.
10  Civil society refers to the arena where public 
debate on issues is conducted, and this is 
known as the ‘deliberative’ or ‘public sphere’ 
perspective on civil society; and/or existence 
of non-market organisations between the 
household and the state, commonly known as 
the ‘associationalist’ view of civil society. The 
non-market organisations may include NGOs, 
social movements, informal organisations and 
other associational organisations (membership 
organisations, etc.) (Borrini-Feyerabend et 
al. 2004:385). In this paper, we use both 
interpretations of civil society to avoid 
‘splitting hairs’ given the cross-cutting nature 
and dynamism of non-market organisations’ 
engagement in public debate. 
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11  In 2003, Botswana was reclassified as 
a ‘middle-income’ country, resulting in 
the withdrawal of many donors from the 
country.
12  Foremost of these are the Wildlife Conservation 
Policy (Government of Botswana 1986) 
and the Tourism Policy (Government of 
Botswana 1990), which call for citizen 
involvement and participation in tourism and 
wildlife-related industries and provide for the 
acquisition of exclusive tourism concessions 
for communities and private enterprises for 
15 years; whilst the Wildlife Conservation 
and National Parks Act (Government of 
Botswana 1992) facilitated community-
based wildlife management through the 
creation of WMAs. These instruments relate 
specifically to wildlife and do not cover other 
natural resources, nor do they contain specific 
provisions on how community involvement is 
to be achieved (Rozemeijer & Van der Jagt 
2000).
13  A SAVINGRAM is a directive issued by the 
Government of Botswana. In January 2001, 
the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of 
Local Government, Mr E. Molale, raised 
government concerns relating to financial 
management in a SAVINGRAM, identifying 
the poor handling and use of funds earned 
from CBNRM projects, the lack of audited 
reports and the misappropriation of CBNRM 
funds by some trusts. As a result, the 
Permanent Secretary instructed that district 
councils – instead of safari operators dealing 
directly with participating communities 
– should manage all funds earned from 
community-based projects in trust. The 
CBNRM stakeholder group effectively 
blocked this SAVINGRAM at the time.
14 This strategy explicitly recognises the need 
to increase community involvement in 
initiating, developing and implementing 
rural development projects, calling for the 
devolution of development responsibilities 
and control to local communities. Whilst 
the launch of this policy was greeted by 
many within the CBNRM community as a 
significant success on their behalf and as 
a great opportunity (Arntzen et al. 2003; 
National CBNRM Forum 2004), there appears 
to date to have been little effort made to 
capitalise on these opportunities. 
15 The degree to which the wildlife-focused 
CBNRM programme actually influenced 
these events, as claimed, rather than the 
broader shift in global discourses and the 
resulting impact on national development 
policies, is questionable given the lack of 
outreach from DWNP to other government 
departments and the limited involvement of 
sections of civil society (including NGOs and 
the private sector) in the programme prior to 
1999.
16  Botswana’s history as a protectorate of the 
British Crown, rather than a colony, ensured 
that it was less affected by colonial rule than 
any other country in southern Africa. This has 
led to various distinctions between Botswana 
and its neighbouring states, nowhere more 
so than in terms of its land tenure systems. 
Settlement by white farmers was never a 
dominant feature and consequently no more 
than 5.5% of the land was ever alienated for 
white-owned farms, compared to nearly 60% 
in Zimbabwe (Tshuma 1997).
17  Leasehold farms were first established 
under the 1975 Tribal Grazing Land Policy 
(TGLP) and were reinforced under the 
fencing component of the 1991 National 
Policy on Agricultural Development (NAPD). 
Leasehold farms are individually owned 
and are inaccessible to non-owners (Peters 
1994).
18  Whilst there have been efforts during the 
1990s to promote tourism as an alternative 
land use in wildlife-rich areas, Mbaiwa 
(2004b) and Hitchcock (2003) demonstrate 
that the bulk of these efforts have benefited 
the private sector rather than the communal 
sector. If the mounting evidence that senior 
political figures are becoming increasingly 
involved in the tourism sector is valid, it 
is perhaps not surprising to see increased 
political pressure to roll back the CBNRM 
policy and ensure greater privatisation.
19  Within the 7th, 8th and current (9th) NDPs, 
wildlife is recognised as one of the country’s 
three main valuable natural resources, 
along with minerals and rangelands, and 
emphasis is placed on the opportunities it 
provides to the diversification of the economy, 
and its importance for rural development 
(Government of Botswana 2003b:71).
20  This dates back to the Tordoff Commission of 
1970 whose recommendations that DC staff 
and finance be substantially improved, were 
adopted (Tordoff 1988).
21  For example, it depends upon the Ministry of 
Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) 
to cover recurrent and capital costs and 
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authorise expenditures, whilst the Ministry 
of Local Government, Lands and Housing 
(MLGLH) controls all decisions relating to 
personnel.
22  There has been progress over the years. 
Picard (1987) characterised Botswana as an 
administrative state in which bureaucratic 
elites had control over processes of decision 
making. By 2003, Wuncsh (2003) claimed that 
the last two decades had seen a considerable 
increase in the influence of local government 
as a result of expanded budgets, technical 
capability and responsibilities ranging 
from social service provision to land use 
planning. 
23  Indeed Wunsch (2003), in a comprehensive 
comparative study of local government in 
South Africa, Swaziland and Botswana, 
concludes that whilst local autonomy is 
limited and there are personnel and operational 
weaknesses in local government, Botswana 
has nevertheless made great progress in the last 
20 years and is the best of the three countries 
in providing quality local governance which 
responds to local needs.
24  Duffy (2000:1) clearly demonstrates how 
appeals to the concept of sustainable use in 
the 1980s and 1990s in Zimbabwe served to 
‘depoliticize internal environmental politics’, 
allowing the local conservation movement 
and allies to present a united front, actively 
engaging in processes of co-construction 
and recursively shaping the way in which 
policy and science supported CBNRM policy 
development in Zimbabwe.
25  Khama’s influence extends into many socio-
political and economic spheres. Not only is he 
the Vice-President, he is also Paramount Chief 
of the Bamangwato and the eldest son of the 
nationally revered Sir Seretse Khama. Thus, 
to paraphrase Mamdani (1996:289), Khama 
is simultaneously the representative of civil 
society whilst also the despotic power over 
native authorities. Khama’s open adoption of 
coercive conservation tactics – using the army 
to engage in anti-poaching activities – and 
his public anti-hunting stance leave no doubt 
about his belief in a protectionist conservation 
paradigm.
26  One of  the  most  s t r iking elements 
characterising these programmes is the lack 
of continuity between them. For example, 
NRMP developed comprehensive training 
tools, none of which are currently in use. 
Both SNV and the European Union (EU) 
each developed alternative approaches. The 
valuable documentary records of the NRMP 
(amounting to hundreds of documents) are no 
longer available in the DWNP library.
27  Bolstering this perception still further is 
the fact that the primary architects of the 
enabling policy framework that facilitated 
the introduction of the NRMP, the director 
of DWNP and several of his key staff, were 
also expatriates. 
28 This is in sharp contrast to the CBNRM 
programmes in Zimbabwe, Namibia and 
elsewhere, which have strong, locally 
conceived conceptual roots (Jones & Murphree 
2001), the development of which created a 
dedicated, cohesive and influential network at 
national and local levels. In Botswana these 
networks are largely absent.
29  This stands in sharp contrast to the situation in 
Zimbabwe where CAMPFIRE has developed 
a strong social and political constituency. 
Despite its apparently volatile political, social 
and economic environment, CAMPFIRE 
is embedded in the political landscape, 
policy environment and rural politics largely 
as a result of the influence of the actor-
network involved in the implementation of 
CAMPFIRE.
30  This programme’s activities included support 
to and nurturing of BOCOBONET, the 
National CBNRM Forum, the North West 
CBNRM Forum and the CBNRM Steering 
Committee, coupled with efforts to document 
and communicate information on CBNRM.
31 The objective was to provide a platform 
for broad stakeholder dialogue on issues of 
common interest, identify constraints and 
ways forward, and enable members to share 
experiences and exchange information. 
32  CBOs traditionally relied on external capacity-
building inputs, which, when withdrawn, 
weakened their institutional support base. 
33  One result of the CKGR controversy is a 
growing national tendency to ‘blame’ the 
San for the international condemnation of 
Botswana’s human rights record as they 
draw international attention to their plight in 
a country used to being fêted as the standard-
bearer for democracy in Africa. Confronted 
with increasingly hostile international 
attention, politicians, government officials 
and the media have unwarrantedly instituted 
a social and political backlash against the 
San.
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34  CBOs established under the auspices of 
CBNRM in Botswana are involved in activities 
encompassing a broad range of different 
natural resources, including veld products 
such as thatching grass, herbal teas, medicinal 
plants collection and marketing, handicraft 
production and tourism-focused ventures such 
as the management of community campsites 
and photographic and hunting safaris in 
partnership with the private sector. Whilst 
CBOs are fairly evenly spread throughout 
the country, direct financial benefits for 
communities from joint venture agreements 
(JVAs) are concentrated in Ngamiland and 
Chobe. The total income from 12 JVAs in 
2002 was estimated at P8.45 million, or 
P735 772 per CBO, a substantial increase in 
revenues from the mid-1990s, which were on 
average below P200 000 per CBO .
35  Approximately P5.6 is equivalent to US$1.
36  The establishment of the village of Khwai has 
never been gazetted and is not recognised as 
a settlement. The government is therefore not 
obliged to provide any of the standard social and 
welfare services, such as schools, water or health 
facilities. The result is that Khwai is generally 
considered to be one of the most marginalised 
villages, with some of the most disadvantaged 
people in Botswana (Taylor 2000; Potts 2003).
37  The important factor in turning around both of 
these CBOs appears to be quality local leadership 
and external facilitation and capacity building. 
38  Habarad (2003) argues that financial devolution 
has inadvertently distorted local political 
processes, creating and strengthening local 
political and economic elites at the expense 
of poor, marginalised members of the rural 
community.
39  In 2003, in Ngamiland, three DWNP extension 
staff had responsibility for providing capacity-
building inputs for twelve CBOs with a 
total aggregate annual income exceeding 
P7 000 000.
40  The efforts to involve NGOs by the BNRMP 
were hampered by lack of capacity, interest 
and geographical reach of existing NGOs, 
and, most notably, by the administrative 
requirements of the donor which only allowed 
for the funding of registered private voluntary 
organisations (PVOs). This greatly restricted 
the choice of implementation partners 
and hindered the process (N. Winer, pers.
comm.).
41   Policy spaces refer to the arenas where various 
actors engage each other to influence policy. 
It essentially entails the public domain and 
political processes of policy making where 
different interest groups (actors) seek to shape 
policy depending on their relative political 
economic power and influence. 
42 The policy implications of the origins 
of CAMPFIRE have been exhaustively 
documented by Murphree (1997), Jones and 
Murphree (2001) and Murombedzi (2003), 
and therefore will not be discussed at length 
here, as we have done above for Botswana, 
where this analysis has not been presented 
prior to this. 
43 The clearest example of this is in the 
government’s revitalisation of the land reform 
process under the fast-track approach. During 
this process, many of the standard planning 
approaches were pushed aside in favour of the 
populist mobilisation of ‘land invaders’, with 
the aim of boosting the ruling party’s waning 
popularity (Keeley & Scoones 2003). 
44  The Natural Resources Act provides for RDCs 
to establish conservation committees that are 
able to make highly interventionist bylaws 
on the use of natural resources, including 
wildlife. The Communal Land Act vests 
ownership of communal land in the state and 
the administration of communal land in the 
hands of the RDCs. The Rural District Council 
Act gives RDCs power to take measures to 
conserve natural resources, permit grazing 
and cultivation, develop land use plans and 
make bylaws for the protection of natural 
resources. The RDCs may issue permits 
for catching fish, hunting, cutting firewood, 
cutting grass and collecting honey. 
45  Throughout the early 1990s, the CCG continued 
to expand to include Africa Resources Trust, 
Action Magazine, SAFIRE and, belatedly, 
the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and 
Urban Development (MILGRUD).
46  As of 2005, WWF was making efforts through 
its Southern African Regional Programme 
Office (SARPO) to re-establish some form 
of support network. 
47  Producer communities are the social groups 
or local communities who bear the cost 
of conservation, and therefore should be 
the direct beneficiaries and managers of 
wildlife.
48  By 2001, only 38% of revenue was returned 
to producer communities, some 20% was 
used for CAMPFIRE management, and over 
40%, compared with an agreed upper limit 
of 15%, was retained by RDCs for general 
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administration purposes (Child et al. 2003).
49  Ninety-five percent of interviewees in 
Chizvirizvi were unable to identify any of the 
office-bearers other than the councillor, were 
unaware of any meetings taking place, were 
unaware of what WDC’s functions should 
be and had never received any benefit nor 
anticipated doing so.
50  It is interesting to note, as demonstrated in 
Table 2, lions were not included on the WMA-
issued quota for 2004. The quota for 2003 was 
awarded at the provincial level and records of 
what it contained are not publicly available. 
The shooting of this lion caused controversy 
locally as it was considered to be a breach of 
procedures, with Malilangwe Trust noting 
that it was an incidence of ‘unethical hunting 
practices’ (Malilangwe Trust 2004:7). 
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